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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation comprises two papers that examine the effect of urban transportation 
systems on employment outcomes and traffic congestion. The first paper evaluates the labor 
market effects of subway systems on low-skilled workers. A model of labor supply predicts that 
this should improve search and employment outcomes. The empirical findings confirm that 
improved subway access increases low-skilled labor force participation. Related effects for light 
rail and bus service are much smaller. For low-skilled men without a car, a 10 percent expansion 
in subway, rail, and bus service increases labor force participation by 3.0, 0.3, and 0.3 percentage 
points, respectively. Improved subway service increases hourly wage, but has no significant 
effect on work hours and commuting time. These findings confirm that subway access increases 
travel speed and has potential to expand the geographic scope of workers’ labor market.  
The second paper investigates the effects of subway expansions on passenger miles 
traveled (PMT) in subways and vehicle miles traveled (VMT) on roads in the US. Drawing on a 
panel dataset that tracks city-level expansions of subway and road systems, estimates indicate 
that the fundamental law of subway congestion holds as the PMT increases one for one with the 
length of the subway systems. Subway systems have substitution and growth effects on road 
traffic. A 10 percent expansion of a subway system reduces contemporaneous traffic on ring 
interstate highways and non-highway arterial roads by 0.7 percent and 1.4 percent, respectively. 
With a three-year lag, a 10 percent increase in subway capacity increases VMT on ring highways 
by 0.4 percent and increase VMT on radial highways by 1.7 percent. Together, these estimates 
suggest that subway expansions do not reduce congestion on radial highways but do relieve 
congestion on roads that are close substitutes to subways (ring highways and non-highway 
arterial roads). 
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Chapter 1: The Effect of Urban Transportation Systems on Employment 
Outcomes and Traffic Congestion 
 
 
Urban transportation systems are central to city formation and urban development, and 
changes in transportation systems are likely to affect every aspect of people’s lives. There has 
been an emerging literature studying the effect of highway systems on city growth, 
suburbanization, inter-city trade, and regional development. However, there exists limited 
evidence on the role of public transit on economic activities and individuals’ behaviors. The two 
papers in this dissertation aim to evaluate the effect of public transit, especially subway systems, 
on low-skilled employment outcomes and urban traffic congestion.  
Subway systems are heavily subsidized by government revenue, as the ticket revenue 
cannot cover the enormous capital and operating costs. There is an ongoing debate on the 
efficiency of these subsidies. Opponents of transit projects believe that transit systems reduce 
welfare and cannot pass the cost-benefit analysis. On the other side of the debate, supporters 
state that there are important public good aspects to public transit and that public transit also has 
potential to address a host of negative externalities. The two papers in this dissertation provide 
more evidence for the debate by estimating the benefits of subway systems in improving low-
skilled employment outcomes and in reducing traffic congestion. While subway systems are 
expensive to build, they also have higher speed, larger capacity, and possibly the largest benefit.  
The first paper in chapter 2 builds on the fact that many low-skilled individuals in the 
US cannot afford automobiles. About 18% of the individuals with less than a high school 
degree do not have access to an automobile in 2014 while this number is only 4 percent for 
people with a college degree or above. The much more limited ability of low-skilled workers to 
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own a vehicle increases their reliance on public transit. That in turn contributes to the 
disproportionate concentration of low-income families in city centers where public transit is 
more cost effective (because of higher density) and more accessible. Improvements in subway 
systems could increase the travel speed of low-skilled workers, extend the geographic scope of 
their labor market, and give them access to better job opportunities. I propose a simple model of 
labor supply in which an increase in travel speed increases search and improves the quality of 
an individual’s labor market outcomes. The predictions of the model are tested by analyzing a 
merged data set with both the information on workers’ employment outcomes and the 
information on city-level changes of subway, light rail and bus systems over time. The 
empirical evidence confirms that subway access significantly increases both the tendency for 
low-skilled individuals to work and their wages. However, the regression results show that the 
effect of subway access on work hours and commuting times is not significant.  
The second paper in chapter 3 evaluates the impact of subway expansions on subway 
ridership and traffic on different types of roads. Congestion on urban road systems has been 
rising in U.S. cities in recent years. The annual delay from congestion on urban road systems 
cost commuters in 471 urban areas in 2014 roughly 42 hours, which was up sharply from 1982 
for which the corresponding estimate was just 18 hours. One policy response to this congestion 
problem is “building your way out of congestion”. This approach, however, is not effective to 
reduce congestion because of the fundamental law of road congestion, which states that the 
elasticity of road traffic with respect to road capacity is at least one. Another proposed method to 
alleviate road congestion is public transit. The current literature, however, has not reached 
consensus on the role of subway systems in congestion relief. By analyzing a panel data set with 
14 cities in 24 years, this paper shows that the passenger miles travelled in subways increases 
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one for one with the length of the subway systems. I also show that subway expansions could 
reduce traffic on ring interstate highways (3-digit interstate highways) and non-highway arterial 
roads, but increase traffic on radial highways (1- or 2-digit interstate highways). The reducing 
effect is consistent with the intuition that improved subway services will make people switch 
from driving to transit riding. The increasing effect might come from the decentralization effect 
of subway systems on city population.  
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1.   Introduction 
It is widely appreciated that low-skilled workers1 are often too poor to afford a vehicle.  
Average annual earnings among household heads with less than a high school degree, for 
example, are $16,447 and 18 percent of these individuals do not own cars.2  The corresponding 
numbers for those with a college degree are $71,648 and just 4 percent, respectively. The much 
more limited ability of low-skilled workers to own a vehicle increases their reliance on public 
transit. That in turn contributes to the disproportionate concentration of low-income families in 
city centers where public transit is more cost effective (because of higher density) and more 
accessible (Glaeser et al., 2008; Brueckner and Rosenthal, 2009). Nevertheless, while these and 
related characteristics of low-skill urban residents are known, the effects of public transit, and 
especially the type of public transit, on labor market opportunities for the poor has been 
overlooked. This paper begins to fill that gap.  
I propose a simple model of labor supply in which an increase in travel speed increases 
search and improves the quality of an individual’s labor market outcomes. An implication of 
this model is that it is important to distinguish among alternate modes of public transit when 
considering the impact of public transit on the labor market opportunities of the poor. That is 
because subways travel at far higher speeds relative to above ground light rail and bus systems.  
Drawing on a panel dataset that tracks expansions to subway, light rail and bus systems over 
time, I examine this and other related questions. To anticipate, evidence confirms that subway 
access significantly increases both the tendency for low-skilled individuals to work and their 
                                                          
1 The low-skilled workers are individuals with less than a high school degree (less than high school completion). Less-
educated, low-skilled, and low levels of education are used interchangeably. 
2 The calculation is for low-skilled household heads whose ages are between 25 and 60 in 2014 American Community Survey. 
For low-skilled individuals living in cities, 32 percent of them do not have access to private vehicles while this number is 16 
percent for highly educated workers. 
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wages.  In contrast, expanding light rail and bus systems has a much smaller effect on the labor 
market outcomes of low-skilled individuals. 
Low-income families are more likely to live in central cities. Schuetz et al. (2017) 
document that central cities in 24 large US MSAs tend to be poor and non-white after analyzing the 
2010-2014 American Community Survey (ACS) data. The stylized fact that low-income families 
are concentrated in central cities is not consistent with the prediction of the standard Alonso-Muth-
Mills urban model. Glaeser et al. (2008) show that the urbanization of poverty comes mainly 
from better access to public transportation in central cities. The presence of public transit is also 
highly predictive of whether low-income households will reside in a specific neighborhood 
(Brueckner and Rosenthal, 2009). Table A1 reveals that compared with people with a high 
school degree or above, low-skilled individuals are more likely to live in the central or principle 
cities of a MSA. A cross sectional analysis indicates that cities with better transit services are 
more likely to have high proportions of low-skilled individuals and low labor force participation 
(LFP) rates (see Table A2).  
Subway construction is controversial because of its enormous cost. As an example, the 
cost of building the Second Avenue Subway in New York City, the first phase of which opened 
on January 1, 2017, is roughly $2.1 billion per mile.3 Ticket fare revenue also typically does not 
cover operating expenses for subway systems (APTA, 2014). In 2014, for example, fare revenue 
only covered 41 percent of operating expenses for the New York City subway system (National 
Transit Database). Most capital and operation funding gaps are filled by government subsidies. 
In 2014, subsidies for all forms of public transit from all levels of governments amounted to $44 
billion (National Transit Database). Despite these enormous subsidies, public transit only 
                                                          
3 The cost number is from: https://www.thoughtco.com/rail-transit-projects-costs-2798796 
 7 
 
 
accounts for 1 percent of total passenger miles traveled (DOT, 2011). Winston and Maheshri 
(2007) compare the sum of consumer surplus and benefits in congestion reduction with the level 
of government subsidy for rail systems in 25 US cities. They conclude that these rail systems 
reduce welfare and cannot pass the cost-benefit analysis.  
On the other side of the public transit debate, supporters of transit projects state that 
there are important public good aspects to public transit and that public transit also has potential 
to address a host of negative externalities.4 These include opportunities to reduce auto 
congestion on the city roads (Anderson, 2014) and reduce air pollution in cities (Gendron-
Carrier et al., 2017). Parry and Small (2009) construct a structure model to study the optimal 
transit subsidy. This model accounts for benefits from reduced congestion, pollution, and traffic 
accidents. They find that fare subsidies for rail and bus transit systems in Washington, DC, Los 
Angeles, and London are welfare improving.  
If subway access has a notable positive effect on employment opportunities for the poor, 
that effect would add to arguments in favor of the provision and expansion of subway systems. 
From this perspective, the possibility exists that subway systems should be partly viewed as 
implicit net transfer programs that are funded by middle and upper income tax payers while 
providing disproportionate benefits for low-income families and low-skilled workers.  
Few studies analyze the impact of subway systems on employment outcomes. Sanchez 
(1999) makes the first attempt and finds people in residential census blocks that have rail or bus 
access in Portland and Atlanta are more likely to work. Holzer et al. (2003) study the expansion 
of San Francisco Bay Area’s rail system, and they find hiring of Latinos increases in areas near 
                                                          
4 See Litman (2007) and Litman (2015) for reviews. 
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the new transit stations. These earlier studies suffer from external validity problems because 
they only focus on one or several cities. These early results may not have identified a causal 
relationship between transit access and labor supply because individuals who want to work may 
sort into neighborhoods with better transit services.  
Subway systems have the potential to mitigate disparities between where low-skilled 
workers live and where their employment opportunities may be found by enabling low-skilled 
workers to search more extensively over longer distances. This idea implicitly forms part of the 
foundation of an extensive literature on spatial mismatch which, in its original context, 
emphasized that reduced proximity to employment contributes to economic strife and reduced 
opportunities (Kain, 1968; Rosenbaum, 1995; Blumenberg and Ong, 1998; Gobillon et al., 
2007; Hellerstein et al., 2014). Measures improving the accessibility to jobs help the low-skilled 
workers. For example, the employment outcomes of low-skilled workers are improved by 
programs that provide housing opportunities for low-income families in neighborhoods outside 
of the central city (Rosenbaum, 1995). Other studies have shown that private vehicle ownership 
improves employment outcomes (Raphael and Rice, 2002; Ong, 2002; Baum, 2009). Subway 
service can be another effective measure to connect workers and jobs.  
This paper offers two primary contributions to the existing literature. To the author’s 
knowledge, it is the first to identify the causal effects of subway expansions on labor market 
outcomes of low-skilled workers using data that represents the continental US. The second 
contribution is that this paper evaluates and compares the effects of subway, bus, and rail 
systems on labor market outcomes for low-skilled workers. Compared with light rail and bus 
transit, subway transit has the most prominent benefits, consistent with its faster travel speed. 
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The effects of public transit on labor market outcomes among low-skilled workers should be 
considered in future policy debates about the costs and benefits of public transit.  
To identify the effects of subway systems on low-skilled employment outcomes, I 
merge Census 1990, Census 2000, and American Community Survey 2005-2014 individual-
level data with a city-level panel dataset that tracks the changes of public transit services for US 
cities. The merged dataset has 12 cities that have subway services, 36 cities that have subway or 
light rail systems, and 161 cities that have bus services. Individuals’ labor market outcomes are 
regressed on demographic characteristics, city transit services, time-varying city attributes, city 
fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The identification of the effects of transit services comes 
from the city-level variation of transit services over time. Private vehicle ownership for each 
individual is endogenous to employment outcome variables. I use a reduced form OLS 
specification, the instrumental variable method, and a sample selection model to solve this 
issue. All three methods show quantitatively similar results.  
The empirical findings are consistent with the predictions of the conceptual model. For 
less-educated men without private vehicles, a 10 percent expansion in subway, rail, and bus 
systems increases their labor force participation by 3, 0.3, and 0.3 percentage points, 
respectively. The impact of subway systems on LFP is the largest. All transit modes have a 
smaller and insignificant effect on LFP for workers who own private vehicles, consistent with 
the intuition that households who own vehicles are less likely to use transit services. The labor 
supply benefit of subway expansions mainly lies in the extensive margin of labor supply, as the 
effect on hours worked per week is not statistically significant. Subway expansions enhance 
wages. This finding implies that higher travel speeds lead to longer commutes, which in turn 
allow workers to commute to jobs that offer higher wages. No significant effect is found for 
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commuting times, supporting the view that subway expansions do not reduce commuting times 
but rather extend the geographic scope of labor market.  
The rest of the paper is organized in the following sections. A theoretical labor supply 
model is built in section 2 and the predictions of the model provide guidance for empirical 
work. Section 3 introduces data and summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
strategy to identify the effects of transit on labor market outcomes. The regression results are 
analyzed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.    A Theoretical Model  
This section outlines a simple model of labor supply to study the effect of a higher 
transit speed on employment outcomes. Improved public transit increases travel speed for low-
skilled workers who may not have sufficient means to own an automobile. Higher transit speeds 
could increase the geographic scope of the individual’s labor market and improve labor market 
outcomes. The implications of higher speeds for LFP, work hours, commuting distance, and 
wages are evaluated below.  
Consider the following static labor supply model. 5 The utility of a representative agent 
depends on income 𝑦𝑦 and leisure 𝑙𝑙:𝑈𝑈(𝑙𝑙,𝑦𝑦). The utility function satisfies the traditional properties 
(decreasing marginal utility, and 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦
> 0). The budget constraints are: 
𝑦𝑦 = 𝑤𝑤(𝑢𝑢)ℎ 
                                                          
5 I assume that people do not relocate in this model. Given that many low-skilled workers are trapped in cities and moving is 
costly, this assumption is not unreasonable. 
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𝑙𝑙 = 𝑇𝑇 − ℎ − 𝑢𝑢
𝑠𝑠
 
The highest wage that the agent receives under commuting distance 𝑢𝑢 is denoted by 𝑤𝑤(𝑢𝑢). 𝑠𝑠 is 
commuting speed and 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑢𝑢
𝑠𝑠
 denotes commuting time. h is work hours. T is total time 
endowment. 
 
2.1        The effect on labor force participation 
A corner solution exists when individuals choose to stay out of the labor force. The 
budget constraints can be rewritten as one equation: 𝑦𝑦 = −𝑤𝑤(𝑢𝑢)𝑙𝑙 + 𝑤𝑤(𝑢𝑢)𝑇𝑇 − 𝑤𝑤(𝑢𝑢) 𝑢𝑢
𝑠𝑠
. Figure 1 
illustrates two possible effects of a higher commuting speed on LFP.  
Given commuting distance 𝑢𝑢 as a constant, figure 1A shows the impact of a higher 
commuting speed 𝑠𝑠 on LFP. The budget constraint will expand from DCA to EBA after an 
increase in 𝑠𝑠. The agent’s consumption bundle will change from point A to point O and the 
agent switches to work after the increase in travel speed.  
Figure 1B displays the effect on tendency to work if commuting distance 𝑢𝑢 becomes 
longer and commuting speed 𝑠𝑠 is a constant. Commuting a longer distance will increase wage 
(𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢) ≥ 0) 6 and reduce time available for work and leisure, so the slope of the budget 
constraint becomes steeper and the horizontal intercept shrinks (from DBA to ECA). The agent 
will shift to work under the higher wage (from A to O). 
                                                          
6 If 𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢) = 0, the effect of a higher speed 𝑠𝑠 on LFP is illustrated in figure 1A. The intuition for 𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢) ≥ 0 is that the maximum 
wage one receives should not decrease with commuting distance (searching geography) 𝑢𝑢 because of better matches between jobs 
and workers. 
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If both commuting speed 𝑠𝑠 and commuting distance 𝑢𝑢 increase, the impact on LFP is 
still positive. Therefore, higher travel speeds will certainly improve tendency to work.  
 
2.2        The effects on intensive margin outcomes  
For agents who choose to work, this subsection evaluates the effects of travel speeds on 
the intensive margin outcome variables, including work hours, commuting distances, and 
commuting times.  
 
2.2.1     Case 1.  𝒘𝒘′(𝒖𝒖) = 𝟎𝟎 
First, consider a special case when 𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢) = 0, i.e., the best wage offer does not rise 
with commuting distances. This is true for minimum-wage workers who have very limited 
education and human capital. For a fixed commuting distance u, the agent chooses h to 
maximize utility: 
max
ℎ
𝑈𝑈(𝑇𝑇 − ℎ − 𝑢𝑢
𝑠𝑠
,𝑤𝑤ℎ) 
The effect of travel speeds on work hours can be easily derived from the first order condition 
and the second order condition. 
𝑑𝑑ℎ
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
= − 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠
/ 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕ℎ2
 > 0 
Similarly, the impact on commuting times is: 
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
= − 1
𝑠𝑠2
< 0 
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The model predicts that higher commuting speeds will lead to longer work hours and shorter 
commuting times if 𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢) = 0. 
 
2.2.2     Case 2. 𝒘𝒘′(𝒖𝒖) ≥ 𝟎𝟎 
The maximum wage 𝑤𝑤(𝑢𝑢) that the agent receives is likely increasing in commuting 
distance 𝑢𝑢 at a decreasing rate (𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢) ≥ 0, 𝑤𝑤′′(𝑢𝑢) ≤ 0).7 More than 60 percent of men with 
less than high school completion earn wages that are higher than minimum wages after 2009. 8 
Many low-skilled workers have the potential to earn higher wages if they have access to more 
job opportunities. As one searches more extensively in geography, he or she could receive 
higher wage offers as a result of better matches between workers and jobs.9 
The agent now varies both ℎ and 𝑢𝑢 to maximize utility: 
max
ℎ,𝑢𝑢 𝑈𝑈(𝑇𝑇 − ℎ − 𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 ,𝑤𝑤(𝑢𝑢)ℎ) 
The effect of travel speeds on work hours, commuting time, and commuting distance are solved 
from the first order and second order optimization conditions. The detailed derivation is in the 
appendix. The effect of travel speeds on work hours is illustrated in equation (1). 
𝑑𝑑ℎ
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
= 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 − 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠
𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕ℎ2
𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2 − ( 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢)2 =
𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
 (1) 
                                                          
7 It should be noted that 𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢) > 0 does not need to hold for all possible values of 𝑢𝑢. 𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢) > 0 should hold for at least one 
value of 𝑢𝑢. If 𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢) = 0 for all values of 𝑢𝑢, this is the case discussed in section 2.2.1. 
8 The minimum wage rates of most states are less than or equal to $9. The 40th percentile of low-skilled men’s wage is $10.1.  
9 This assumption is maintained in Holzer et al. (1994), and is consistent with empirical evidence (Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1989; 
Holzer et al., 1994; Raphael and Rice, 2002; Baum, 2009). 
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As is shown in the appendix, the relative sizes of the substitution and income effects 
determine the sign of 𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢
 and the sign of 𝑑𝑑ℎ
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
. A large substitution effect makes 𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢
 and 𝑑𝑑ℎ
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
 
positive. In this case, improvements in travel speed will increase work hours. If substitution 
effect is so small that 𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢
 is far below zero and 𝑑𝑑ℎ
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
 is negative, higher travel speeds lead to fewer 
work hours.  
Similarly, the impact of commuting speeds on commuting distances is: 
𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
= 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 − 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕ℎ2 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠
𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕ℎ2
𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2 − ( 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢)2 =
𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
 (2) 
The relative sizes of the substitution and income effects still determine the sign of 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
. The effect 
of commuting speeds on commuting distances cannot be directly tested empirically, as the 
Census data does not have information on commuting distances. An indirect method, however, is 
studying the influence of public transit on wages. A significantly positive effect between transit 
services and wages indicates that transit extends commuting distances ( 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
> 0) and wages are 
increasing in commuting distances (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
> 0).   
The impact of travel speeds on commuting times is derived from 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢 = 𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 + 𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡: 
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
= 1
𝑠𝑠
(𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
− 𝑡𝑡) (3) 
Equation (3) indicates that travel speeds have an undetermined effect on travel times. If the 
higher travel speeds increase commuting distances a lot, commuting times may increase. 
Alternatively, commuting times will decline with travel speeds if higher speeds decrease or have 
zero effect on commuting distances.  
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The above analysis indicates that higher travel speeds will certainly improve LFP. 
Increases in commuting speeds will increase work hours and reduce commuting times if 
𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢) = 0. However, the effect on work hours, commuting distances, and commuting times is 
uncertain under the assumption 𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢) ≥ 0. The empirical findings that transit systems improve 
wages but have no significant effect on work hours and commuting distances are consistent 
with the assumption 𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢) ≥ 0. 
The model also indicates that subway transit is likely to have the largest impact on 
employment opportunities, as subway systems are faster than light rail and bus systems.10 In 
addition to public transit expansions, this model can also be applied to other contexts where 
commuting costs decrease, including vehicle ownership and highway expansions.  
 
3. Data 
The individual level data used in this paper is from IPUMS ACS and Decennial Census 
(Ruggles et al., 2015). Specifically, data for 1990 and 2000 are from the decennial Census; and 
data for 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 are from ACS. The 
Census data only identifies cities with populations above 100,000. The level of transit services in 
each city in each year is from National Transit Database (NTD). The NTD data is merged to 
Census data by year and city. The analysis focuses on men and single women between the ages 
of 25 and 60.11 
                                                          
10 The theoretical model predicts that a larger increase in travel speeds will lead to a larger impact on the employment outcome 
variables. In addition to travel speed, other factors might also be able to explain why subway systems have the largest effect. For 
example, subway systems usually serve the downtown areas and are efficient at moving people in and out of central cities. 
Testing which channel explains the largest effect of subway systems is beyond the scope of this paper. 
11 Compared with men and single women, the labor supply decisions of married women are more elastic and are more likely to 
be influenced by their partners’ employment outcomes. To model the labor supply decisions of married women, one has to 
consider the labor supply decisions of their partners simultaneously. Solving this complexity is beyond the scope of this 
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The NTD was established by Congress to be the nation’s primary source for information 
and statistics on the transit systems in the United States. Recipients or beneficiaries of grants 
from the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) are required by statute to submit data to the NTD. 
Over 660 transit providers currently report to the NTD through the Internet-based reporting 
system. The NTD data provides annual information on transit facilities, service levels, funding 
sources, revenues, and costs for Urbanized Area and for cities throughout the 1991-2014 period. 
In order to add the 1990 Census data to my sample, I use transit data for 1991 in the 1990 census 
year.  
In order to compare the effects of different transit modes, three variables are constructed 
to represent the service levels of bus, subway, and rail transit in each city. The number of buses 
operated on the day of maximum service denotes the level of bus service. Subway and rail 
service levels are measured by total directional route miles in each city.12 For any given travel 
speed, the quality of public transit riding experience depends on the degree of congestion, as 
congestion may increase wait times for an available ride and crowding can reduce ride comfort 
levels. Both concerns increase with population for a given public transit network.  For that 
reason, public transit services for each city are measured by number of buses per 1000 people, 
subway miles per 1000 people, and rail miles per 1000 people.13  
                                                          
paper. Thus, married women are excluded from the primary analysis. I conduct similar analysis for married women without 
solving the two-earner labor supply problem, and the empirical results not shown here are qualitatively similar to the analysis 
for men and single women.    
12 These three variables are available from data. Duranton and Turner (2011) use number of buses to measure public transit 
service. Gonzalez-Navarro and Turner (2016) use total subway line miles to represent subway services in cities. Directional 
route miles refer to the mileage in each direction over which public transportation vehicles travel.  
13 The number of buses per capita or subway/rail miles per capita is very small in magnitude. Using these per capita measures 
leads to very large coefficients in regression analysis. In order to have moderate magnitudes for the regression coefficients, buses 
per 1000 people and subway/rail miles per 1000 people are used.  
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Table 1 displays summary statistics for transit measures. There are 12 subway cities in 
the US.14 Compared with the cross sectional variation, the temporal variation in total subway 
miles is smaller. Most subway cities have experienced changes in their subway networks 
between 1991 and 2014. Table A3 shows the length of subway systems in each city from 1990 to 
2014. It can be seen that Washington, DC, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Atlanta, 
Baltimore, and Miami have had sizeable extensions of their subway systems during this period. 
These subway expansions are achieved gradually, so there are multiple changes in the length of 
subway systems across time. For example, the metro system in Washington, DC was 156.2 miles 
in 1990, then increased to 193.5 miles in 2000, and reached 211.8 miles in 2005. 
There are 31 cities with light rail systems during 1991-2014.15  The light rail measure 
includes the sum of miles for light rail, hybrid rail, and commuter rail that connects cities and 
their suburbs. The variation of rail systems over time is larger than that of subways. Hundreds of 
cities have bus service. Bus service has the largest variation across cities and time, as the costs of 
varying bus service levels are low. 
Four employment outcomes are considered in this paper, including LFP, hourly wages, 
work hours, and commuting times. Table 2 summarizes employment outcomes for different 
groups of people. Compared with all workers (79%), LFP rate is lower for low-skilled men 
(71%). LFP is the lowest for low-skilled working-age cohorts who do not own a vehicle (49%). 
However, the difference in hours worked per week between low-skilled workers and all people is 
                                                          
14 Los Angeles, CA, Oakland (San Francisco), CA, Washington, DC, Miami, FL, Chicago, IL, Boston, MA, NYC, NY, 
Baltimore, MD, Jersey City, NJ, Cleveland, OH, Philadelphia, PA, Atlanta, GA. These 12 subway cities are in 11 states. The 
subway systems are defined as heavy rail systems in NTD. Part of a subway system may be above ground. 
15 Little Rock, AR, Phoenix, AZ, Los Angeles, CA, Orange, CA, Sacramento, CA, San Francisco, CA, Stockton, CA, Denver, 
CO, Chicago, IL, New Orleans, LA, Boston, MD, Baltimore, MD, Minneapolis, MN, Charlotte, NC, Newark, NJ, Buffalo, NY, 
New York City, NY, Cleveland, OH, Portland, OR, Philadelphia, PA, Pittsburgh, PA, Memphis, TN, Nashville-Davidson, TN, 
Austin, TX, Houston, TX, Lewisville, TX, Salt Lake City, UT, Alexandria, VA, Hampton, VA, Seattle, WA. 
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much smaller than the difference in tendency to work. Compared with all workers, the low-
skilled groups have lower wages. Unsurprisingly, average commuting time for workers who do 
not have access to private vehicles is longer. The low-skilled workers in general have lower 
wages, fewer work hours, and longer commuting times than more skilled workers do, and low-
skilled working-age adults are less likely to work than their more skilled counterparts are.   
    
4. Empirical Strategy 
Two groups of individuals whose ages are between 25 and 60 are studied: men and single 
women with less than a high school degree. Workers with low levels of education are not likely 
to own vehicles and have to rely on public transit. The less-educated men are chosen as the 
primary focus because of their larger sample size.16 The analysis for single women serves as a 
robustness check.  
Transit service information is merged with multiple-year Census and ACS data. Pooling 
data from different years enables me to control for city and year fixed effects, which eliminate 
city or year time invariant unobserved factors that may bias the estimates.17 The identification 
comes from the variation of transit services over time. 
For worker 𝑗𝑗 in city 𝑐𝑐 at year 𝑡𝑡, the labor market outcomes are modeled as the following 
equation: 
                                                          
16 Including both married men and single men in my analysis maintains a large sample, and I control for marital status in the 
regression. I also conduct a robustness check by studying the effect of transit on single men with less than high school 
completion. The regression results not shown here indicate that the results from low-skilled single men are qualitatively similar to 
the results using all low-skilled men.  
17 Another reason for using Census and ACS data is that they have city-level geographic information. This city-level geographic 
information enables me to know the city in which an individual resides. Many panel data sets, including NLSY, PSID, and SIPP, 
do not have city geography information. 
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           𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (4) 
𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 represents LFP status, work hours, commuting time or wage rate. 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗, 𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗, and 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 are 
average measures for subway, bus, and rail services. 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 is a vector of individual characteristics, 
including age and its quadratic term, gender, marital status, education (less than a high school 
degree, high school degree or some college, college degree or above), race (white non-Hispanic, 
white Hispanic, Black, Asian), disability status, have children younger than 13 or not, citizenship  
status, number of years in the US, and English speaking skill. Interaction terms of these variables 
are also controlled. Thirty-two industry fixed effects are included when commuting times, work 
hours and wages are the left-hand side variables. The occupation earning score is included as a 
control variable in the regression when the dependent variable is hourly wage. 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗  denotes 
whether the household has access to private vehicles. 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 denotes time varying city 
characteristics, including city population, population density, percent of people with a college 
degree or above, percent of people with a high school degree or some college, 18 labor demand 
shock (Bartik shift-share instrument; Bartik, 1992), 19 state unemployment rate. 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 and 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 are city 
and year fixed effects. 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is an error term. 
An assumption for identification is that the transit variables are exogenous to the left-
hand side variables after controlling for other covariates. However, there can be three threats for 
this assumption. First, omitted variable bias is possible. Second, transit service variables can be 
endogenous as cities may supply more transit services in response to poor labor market 
                                                          
18 Percent of individuals without high school diploma is the omitted base group. 
19 This variable is constructed as the weighted averages of national employment growth across industries using city industry 
employment shares as weights. It measures local labor demand in each city in each year. 
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outcomes. Lastly, sorting of low-skilled workers across cities may also bias the estimates, 
although sorting within a city is not an issue here as the transit measures are at the city level. 
There are several arguments supporting that these endogeneity issues do not drive the 
empirical results and the exogeneity assumption is likely to hold. First, the individual 
characteristics, city fixed effects, year fixed effects, and time varying covariates of cities should 
absorb most of the correlation between the transit variables and the error term, so omitted 
variable bias should be small. Second, there is little evidence showing that cities respond to 
workers’ labor market outcomes by varying transit services. Public transit projects are usually 
built to solve congestion or air pollution problems, and improving employment outcomes for 
low-skilled workers is seldom considered as the primary purpose of these projects. Local 
governments usually apply federal funding to expand transit services, especially for light rail and 
subway systems. The distribution of federal capital funding can be inefficient and may not be 
correlated with local needs.20  
Third, public transit projects, especially for subway and rail transit, take years to raise 
funding, design and construct. 21 Compared with the time when the project was proposed, the 
employment outcomes of low-skilled workers at project completion can change significantly. 
Local governments have little room to manipulate the openings of transit projects, which act like 
random shocks to the city. The transit variables are not likely to be endogenous. Fourth, I control 
                                                          
20 In 2013, 42% of the capital funding comes from federal government (APTA, 2015). Berechman (2010) mentions “...the 
proclivity of local decision makers to accept a project regardless of its actual benefits and risks increases with the proportion of 
funding obtained from higher levels...Our hypothesis states that local authorities, as recipients of federal and state money, tend to 
regard external funding as costless and as political benefits. They are therefore predisposed to promoting infrastructure projects 
containing a large external funding component...this tendency promotes the implementation of inefficient projects, selected 
without any regard for their social rate of return.” 
21 For example, the No.7 subway extension in New York City stretches 1 mile southwest from its previous terminus. This project 
was originally proposed in 2005, and construction started in 2007. The extension’s opening was pushed back multiple times from 
its original target of December 2013. The extension finally opened to the public in September 2015. This project of building 1-
mile subway takes 10 years. 
 21 
 
 
for the ratio of low-skilled workers in each city in each year, and this helps solve the inter-city 
sorting problem. Regressing the ratio of low-skilled workers in each city on transit variables 
shows that transit variables have no significant effect on the proportion of less-educated 
individuals. Controlling for individual characteristics also mitigates this sorting issue. These 
individual controls are expected to be correlated with individual unobservables. Lastly, the 
results (Table A4) from an exogeneity test (Caetano, 2015) cannot reject the null that the transit 
variables are exogenous to the city-level LPF rates of low-skilled men. This test does not require 
the existence of instrumental variables and can only be applied in models with bunching points. 
As many cities do not have subway systems, I have many observations that are bunching at point 
0 (0 subway miles).  
In addition to the arguments above, I also have two sets of placebo tests that help verify 
the validity of the primary findings for low-skilled men who own no automobile. The first 
placebo test is studying the effect of public transit on the employment outcomes of highly 
educated workers. There are two reasons for the expectation that the labor supply decisions of 
workers with a college degree or above should not depend on public transit services. First, highly 
educated individuals can afford an automobile and rely less on public transit. The ratio of highly 
educated individuals who own private vehicles is 96 percent in 2014 while this number is only 
82 percent for low-skilled workers. Second, highly educated individuals are more likely to have 
good job opportunities in labor markets because of better education. The second placebo test is 
conducting the same analysis for low-skilled men who have access to automobiles. These 
individuals benefit less from transit services and public transit services should have no or much 
smaller effect on their employment outcomes.  
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Public transit use is highly related to the private vehicle ownership variable 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 . 
Households who do not have private vehicles (no-vehicle group) have to rely on public transit, 
while households who own vehicles (vehicle group) rely less on public transit. To compare the 
effects of public transit for workers with and without a vehicle, it is interesting to run separate 
regressions for the vehicle group and the no-vehicle group. However, vehicle ownership is 
endogenous to work decisions because individuals in the labor force are more likely to afford 
vehicles. Failing to account for this endogeneity may bias the estimates of the coefficients of the 
transit variables. I use a reduced form OLS, 2SLS, and sample selection model to solve this 
problem. 
 
4.1 Reduced form OLS 
Suppose the vehicle ownership variable 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗  is determined by the same covariates as LFP: 
𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼5𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝜅𝜅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (5) 
Substitute the vehicle ownership equation into the labor supply equation: 
𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽5𝛼𝛼0+(𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽5𝛼𝛼1)𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + (𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽5𝛼𝛼2)𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + (𝛽𝛽3 + 𝛽𝛽5𝛼𝛼3)𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 +                        (𝛽𝛽4 + 𝛽𝛽5𝛼𝛼4)𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 + (𝛽𝛽6 + 𝛽𝛽5𝛼𝛼5)𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + (1 + 𝛽𝛽5)𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + (1 + 𝛽𝛽5)𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗+ 𝜅𝜅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (6) 
This equation is a reduced form specification as 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗  is substituted out. The reduced form estimate 
is a lower bound of 𝛽𝛽1 if 𝛽𝛽5𝛼𝛼1 < 0, is an upper bound if 𝛽𝛽5𝛼𝛼1 > 0, and is consistent if 𝛽𝛽5𝛼𝛼1 = 0. 
If the individual characteristics (𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗) are driving the vehicle ownership decision and 𝛼𝛼1 is close to 
zero, the reduced form OLS is likely to be consistent. For the sake of simplicity and 
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interpretation, this model is estimated by simple OLS, although the estimates are robust to a logit 
model. 22 
 
4.2 2SLS and Heckman sample selection model 
Equation (6) can be estimated by 2SLS with valid and strong instruments for 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 . 
Following Raphael and Rice (2002) and Baum (2009), state asset rules for welfare eligibility of 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the state gasoline tax, and state auto 
insurance premiums are used as instruments for the vehicle ownership variable.23 These 
instruments are valid because they are determined by states’ political processes, gasoline tax 
regulation of each state, and the state-level auto insurance market, so the instruments are not 
correlated with individual labor market outcomes. Now equation (5) changes to 
𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼5𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼6𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝜅𝜅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (7) 
𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 denotes the instruments. 𝑠𝑠 represents state.  
The state asset rules for eligibility of TANF refer to the maximum vehicle asset one can 
hold for being eligible of welfare. These rules vary across states and time. Following Sullivan 
(2006) and Baum (2009), I use two variables to characterize these rules. The first variable is a 
dummy indicating whether auto vehicles are included in the asset set determining welfare 
eligibility, and equals one if included, and zero otherwise. The second variable is the exempted 
                                                          
22 To test the robustness of using simple OLS to model the binary LFP decision, a logit model is employed to estimate the 
impacts of transit on LFP. The regression results not shown here are very similar to the OLS results. The linear 2SLS estimation 
results (introduced in Section 3.2) are also robust to two logit regressions where the predicted residuals from the first stage are 
included in the second stage.  
23 Eligibility rules for welfare are from Urban Institutes Welfare Rules Database. State average insurance premium is from the 
Auto Insurance Database Report of National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Gasoline tax information is from the 
Brookings/Urban Institute’s Tax Policy Center. The four state level instruments are linked to individual level data by year and 
state. 
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amount of vehicle value if auto vehicles are included in asset values when determining welfare 
eligibility. For example, one state may require that vehicle values cannot exceed $5,000. In this 
case, the dummy variable equals one and the exempted amount variable equals $5,000. These 
regulations may change over time.  If, for example, the new rule is that vehicle assets do not 
affect eligibility, the dummy variable equals zero and the exempted amount equals zero. 
The gasoline taxes and state-level insurance premiums influence vehicle ownership 
through the costs of maintaining and driving an automobile. Although the gasoline tax rate per 
gallon is small, the amount of tax paid can be large, especially for people who drive a lot. The 
insurance premium is a large monthly payment and can be a heavy burden for low-income 
individuals. For example, the average annual premium in New York State in 2013 is $1301.  
The summary statistics for these four instruments are displayed in table A5. It can be seen 
that there are sizeable changes in these four variables across time, and these temporal variations 
are used for identification in a fixed effect model.  
An alternative specification to use the instruments is Heckman sample selection model 
(Heckman, 1979), which corrects the sample selection bias of estimating the effects of public 
transit for the vehicle group and the no-vehicle group. The first stage of the sample selection 
model is a probit model estimating equation (7). Heckman’s inverse Mills ratio is included as a 
sample correction term in the second stage. The specification for the no-vehicle group is 
𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌�𝑝𝑝�𝑗𝑗� + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (8) 
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𝜌𝜌�𝑝𝑝�𝑗𝑗� = −𝜙𝜙(𝑣𝑣�𝑗𝑗)Φ(𝑣𝑣�𝑗𝑗) is the inverse Mills ratio term. 𝜌𝜌 is standard deviation of 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗. 𝜌𝜌 is correlation 
coefficient between 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 and 𝜅𝜅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗. For the vehicle group, the specification is the same except 
𝜌𝜌�𝑝𝑝�𝑗𝑗� = 𝜙𝜙(𝑣𝑣�𝑗𝑗)Φ(−𝑣𝑣�𝑗𝑗). 24 
    
5. Results 
5.1 The effect of public transit on labor force participation 
5.1.1 Reduced form OLS 
Table 3 displays OLS regression results from the reduced form model (equation 6) for 
men with different levels of education. The dependent variable is equal to one if this individual is 
in labor force, and is zero otherwise. The full sample (all 161 cities), subway or rail cities, 
subway cities, and bus only cities are analyzed consecutively for robustness checks. 25 
Regression results reported in panel A are from the full sample. Subway services are 
found to increase the LFP of both low-skilled men and men with a high school degree or some 
college, although the effect for the former group is much larger than that of the latter group. The 
low-skilled men benefit more from subway services. Unsurprisingly, the coefficients of all public 
transit modes are small and insignificant for men with a college degree or above in all panels. 
This is consistent with the expectation that public transit availability is not a key factor in 
determining the LFP of highly educated workers. The regression results reported in column (3) 
                                                          
24 Although the sample selection model assumes the distribution of error terms is jointly normal, the empirical results are not 
sensitive to this normal assumption. I follow Terza et al. (2008) and include the first stage predicted residuals instead of the 
inverse mills ratio term in the second stage regression. I also use a logit regression to model the second stage. The regression 
results not shown here are similar to the results obtained under the normal assumption.  
25 Subway or rail cities include cities that have subway or rail transit. Subway cities are those cities that have subway systems. 
Bus only cities contain cities that only have bus transit. 
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serve as a placebo test and help to confirm the correct specification of labor supply equation 
(equation 4).  
Results for subway or rail cities in panel B are very similar, but the coefficient of subway 
miles per 1000 people is larger than the result in panel A. The service levels of rail transit start to 
increase the LFP of low-skilled men. The impact of subway miles is larger than the effect of rail 
miles. Subway services have the largest effect in subway cities (panel C). Panel D results for bus 
transit services show no statistically significant effect on LFP in bus only cities.  
Results shown in Table 3 display evidence consistent with expectations, and support the 
specification of equation (4). The empirical findings also reveal statistically significant and 
positive impacts of better subway services on LFP. However, as noted above, the OLS estimates 
may be inconsistent if vehicle ownership is endogenous. To solve this endogeneity problem, the 
following analysis uses 2SLS and Heckman’s sample selection model to identify the effects of 
transit on LFP.  
 
5.1.2 2SLS and Heckman sample selection model 
From here on, the analysis focuses on low-skilled workers as they benefit the most from 
public transit. Table 4 shows the regression results for the decision to own a private vehicle or 
not, which forms the first stages of 2SLS and Heckman’s selection model. The dependent 
variable is binary with one indicating an individual living in a household that has one or more 
vehicles and zero indicating the household owning no automobile. The first stage for 2SLS is an 
OLS regression following equation (7), and the first stage for the sample selection model is a 
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probit regression following equation (7). As all instruments are at the state level, standard errors 
are clustered at states.  
For subway cities (column 3 and column 4), the first stages of the instrumental variables 
(IVs) are strong, with F statistics far larger than ten. The instruments pass the Sargan over-
identification test, which further verifies they are valid. With the other covariates controlled, 
higher auto insurance premiums and gasoline taxes predict lower probabilities of owning an 
automobile. Tighter asset rules of welfare eligibility make workers less likely to have private 
vehicles for use.26 The effects of instruments on vehicle ownership are consistent with the 
findings of Raphael and Rice (2002) and Baum (2009). The state auto insurance premium and 
gasoline tax are statistically significant in the probit model for subway or rail cities, although the 
F statistics for the OLS first-stage regression is less than ten. However, none of the instruments is 
significant for the full sample (all cities) and the bus only sample (bus only cities).  
Two reasons may explain why these instruments are strong in subway cities but weak in 
bus only cities. First, compared with subway systems, bus transit is much slower in travel speed 
and is often not on time. It is very hard for low-skilled workers to travel long distances within 
short periods (e.g., 30 minutes) by bus. Thus, low-skilled individuals in bus only cities have to 
rely more on private vehicles and their vehicle ownership status is not sensitive to the 
instruments. Low-skilled workers in subway cities have much better travel alternatives (subway 
transit), so their vehicle ownership decisions are more sensitive to the instruments. The second 
possible reason is that the number of observations in each bus only city is small, as bus only 
cities are likely to have small city sizes. The smaller sample size for each bus only city may lead 
                                                          
26 The welfare eligibility rule is tight under two cases. The first case is that one is not eligible for welfare if she owns a vehicle. 
Another situation is that one is not eligible if she owns a vehicle whose value exceeds a small number, e.g. $2000. 
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to weak power. Because of the weak instruments problems, one has to be careful in explaining 
the 2SLS and sample selection results for all cities and bus only cites. In these cases, I put more 
weight on the OLS results. 
The results from the second stage regressions are reported in table 5. The dependent 
variable is binary with one indicating one is in labor force and zero otherwise. For ease of 
comparison, OLS regression results are also listed in table 5. The same models are estimated 
using observations from all cities, subway or rail cities, subway only cities, and bus only cities. 
For the sake of space, regression results for all cities and subway cities are shown in table 5, and 
estimates for subway or rail cities and bus only cities are displayed in the appendix (table A6). 
Panel A in table 5 shows the regression results using the full sample (all cities). Results in 
column (1) control for the vehicle ownership variable explicitly. The significant coefficient of 
subway service is 0.429, which is very close to the result (0.437 in table 3) obtained in the 
reduced form OLS regression. Consistent with the existing literature, access to vehicles 
significantly improves tendency to work. Column (2) and column (3) display OLS regression 
results for the no-vehicle group and the vehicle group. Better bus and subway services 
significantly increase the LFP of low-skilled men without automobiles and have no significant 
effect on the LFP of low-skilled men who own automobiles. As already noted, the OLS results 
may have sample selection bias, as the vehicle ownership may be endogenous with the decision 
to work.  To account for the bias, I use instrumental variables and column (4) shows the second 
stage results of 2SLS where the subway service variable remains statistically significant. In 
column (5) and column (6), I report results that use Heckman’s sample selection model to 
account for sample selection bias. The results show that both bus and subway services 
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significantly increase LFP. However, the 2SLS and Heckman selection model results here may 
suffer from weak instruments problems. 
Regression results in panel B use individuals from subway cities. 27 The instruments are 
very strong for subway cities. The analysis for panel A holds qualitatively in panel B. The 2SLS 
and sample selection estimates are similar to the corresponding OLS results. The inverse Mills 
ratio terms are not significant, indicating that the sample selection bias is not present. Findings 
here support the view that public transit only improves LFP for workers who do not have private 
vehicles. This result rules out the uncontrolled common trends that might increase the LFP for 
both the vehicle group and the no-vehicle group.  
The OLS coefficient of subway service variable in panel B is 0.655, which is similar to 
the 2SLS estimate (0.556) and the reduced form OLS result (0.695). This implies that the OLS 
estimates have small biases. The sample selection model for the no-vehicle group further 
confirms this. The coefficients of subway, bus, and rail service variables in the selection model 
are 3.770, 0.0369, and 0.0713, which are not significantly different from the OLS results where 
the corresponding coefficients are 3.910, 0.0366, and 0.119.  The inverse Mills ratio term is small 
and not significant for the no-vehicle group, confirming the results from sample selection models 
are not significantly different from the OLS estimates. A simple Z test cannot reject the null that 
the estimates under OLS and sample selection models are the same. 
The results in panel C (table A6) include individuals from subway or light rail cities. The 
analysis for Panel B holds here, except that rail systems now have a significant positive effect on 
                                                          
27 On average, the regressions have 501 low-skilled men in a subway city in each year and 200 low-skilled men without 
automobiles in a subway city in each year. 
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tendency to work. No significant impact is found for bus transit in bus only cities (panel D in 
table A6).  
The same series of regressions are conducted for men with a college degree or above. 
Results not shown here indicate that there is no significant impact of public transit on LFP in any 
specification, regardless of vehicle ownership. This finding is consistent with results in Table 3 
and the expectation that transit has no effect on high-skilled workers’ employment outcomes. 
This result rules out the uncontrolled common trends that might increase the LFP for both the 
low-skilled workers and the high-skilled workers. 
The sample selection model for the no-vehicle group is my preferred specification 
because this model focuses on people who can benefit the most from transit and removes 
potential sample selection bias. The coefficient of subway service in subway cities is 3.77, which 
means LFP will increase by 377 percentage points if subway miles per 1000 people increase by 
one. The sample average of this subway measure in 2014 is 0.075 miles per 1000 people. 
Therefore, doubling the 2014 subway miles increases the LFP of low-skilled no-vehicle men by 
28 percentage points (3.77 × 0.075 × 100) on average. Similarly, doubling the 2014 number of 
buses in subway and rail cities can increase tendency to work by 3.4 percentage points (from 
estimates in Panel B: 0.039 × 0.87 × 100). Increasing the 2014 rail miles in subway and rail cities 
by 100 percent will increase probability of working by 3.0 percentage points (from estimates in 
panel C of table A5: 0.122 × 0.24 × 100).  
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5.2 The effect of public transit on intensive margin outcomes 
For people choosing to work, this subsection reports results on the effects of transit 
services on intensive margin outcomes, including work hours, hourly wages, and commuting 
times. Thus, the analysis only applies to employed low-skilled workers.  
According to the theoretical model in section 2, the effects of public transit on work 
hours and commuting times depend on 𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢). For minimum-wage earners (𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢) = 0), better 
transit services increase hours of work and reduce commuting times. If the maximum wage one 
can receive is increasing in commuting distance (𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢) ≥ 0), the effect on work hours and 
commuting times is not determined. As the data do not contain the information on individual 
commuting distances, the relationship between wages and commuting distances is tested by 
evaluating the effect of transit systems on wages.  
Table 6 shows the results of regressing hourly wages, work hours, and commuting times 
on transit services and other covariates. For brevity, I only display the results for subway cities. 
The regression results for the other cities are qualitatively similar.  
The results in panel A indicate that there is weak evidence supporting that transit services 
improve wage rates for low-skilled workers in subway cities. 28 Columns (1) and (2) show that 
light rail services improve wages, but these results are not robust to the 2SLS and sample 
selection models. A possible explanation for this null finding is that many low-skilled men have 
part-time jobs and earn minimum wages. The minimum-wage earners have low-levels of human 
capital and they cannot find higher wages even if they commute longer distances. To test 
                                                          
28 The dependent variable is hourly wage that is calculated by dividing annual wage income by hours worked per week and 
working weeks in a year. The hourly wage rate may suffer from measurement errors. People may report inaccurate information 
for hours worked per week. The information on number of work weeks in a year in ACS and Census is an interval variable. I 
choose the midpoint of the interval as the number of weeks. This may introduce measure errors, too. The measurement errors bias 
the estimate towards zero.  
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whether transit services enhance wages for full-time workers, I run similar regressions using 
low-skilled men who work 35 or more hours per week. I find a positive and statistically 
significant effect of subway service levels on wage rates in both the OLS and the sample 
selection models (see table A7).  
A positive relationship between subway services and hourly wages indicates that faster 
transit speeds extend commuting distances (𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
> 0) and wage rates are likely to increase in 
commuting distances (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
> 0). Under those circumstances, the theoretical model yields 
ambiguity about the effects of subway service levels on work hours and commuting times.    
The results from all specifications in panel B show that transit services do not have 
statistically significant effects on work hours. Similar regressions are run for less-educated men 
who work 35 or more hours per week, and the results indicate no significant effect of transit 
services on hours worked per week.  
The impacts of public transit on commuting times are shown in panel C. No significant 
effect exists. Therefore, the regression results support the conclusion that all three transit modes 
have no significant impact on commuting times. The analysis using less-educated men who work 
35 or more hours per week shows similar patterns. Expanding the subway systems are likely to 
increase both commuting distances and commuting speeds, so the net effect on commuting times 
could be null.29 
 
                                                          
29 The high-skilled men are analyzed by similar regressions, and I find no significant impact of transit on wage rates, hours 
worked per week, and commuting times. 
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5.3 Robustness checks 
In addition to less-educated men, the same analysis is conducted for single women with 
less than a high school degree. For brevity and space, I only display results from the sample 
selection model for the vehicle group and the no-vehicle group in Table A8, although all other 
specifications (OLS, 2SLS) show similar results. The empirical results confirm that subway 
services improve tendency to work for low-skilled single women who do not have access to 
automobiles. On average, doubling the current subway miles increases the LFP of no-vehicle 
low-skilled single women by 32 percentage points, which is similar in magnitude to the effect for 
low-skilled men. The impacts on wage rates, hours worked per week, and commuting times are 
consistent with the findings for low-skilled men.30 
The transit service variables used in previous analysis are in per capita terms. This raises 
the concern that some variations in these measures might come from the changes in city 
population. To test the robustness of the main results to different types of transit measures, I also 
conduct the same empirical analysis using the aggregate levels (e.g., subway miles, rail miles, 
and number of buses) to measure transit services in cities. The results in table A9 confirm that 
the significant effect of subway systems on LFP is robust to the aggregate measures. 
The third robustness check is testing whether the empirical results are driven by an outlier 
city. Table A10 displays the regressions results for all subway cities except New York City. The 
estimated effects are similar to the results in panel B of table 5. I also try to exclude the other 
subway cities sequentially, and the regression results are qualitatively similar.    
                                                          
30 Individuals with disabilities may also benefit from public transit services. Disabled people cannot drive and have to rely on 
public transit. However, the sample size of no-vehicle disabled people in my data is small. Another problem is that Census and 
ACS data does not have information on the degree of disabilities. Without information on the degree of disabilities, I cannot 
analyze the effects of public transit services on work for people with disabilities. The analysis for disabled people is left for future 
research. 
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6.          Conclusions 
Public transit is an important transportation option for low-skilled workers who cannot 
afford private vehicles. The average speed of subway system in New York City is about 15 miles 
per hour, which is much faster than the average speed (9 miles per hour) of driving in 
Manhattan.31 Subway systems have the potential to help low-skilled workers search for jobs and 
commute to work.  
This paper identifies the effects of subway systems on employment outcomes of low-
skilled workers. For low-skilled men without automobiles, the empirical findings show that 
expanding subway systems by 10 percent increases their LFP by 3 percentage points. The impact 
of subway service is much larger than the effects of rail and bus systems. Subway access is found 
to increase wages, but has no significant effect on work hours and commuting times. All these 
findings imply that better subway services help low-skilled workers by increasing their travel 
speeds and extending the geographic scope of their labor market. 
Accounting for the benefits identified in this paper is important in cost-benefit analysis of 
public transit programs. Although a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis is out the scope of this 
paper, a simple back-of-envelope analysis will still provide some estimates for the magnitudes of 
these benefits. For an average subway city with a subway network of 65 miles (130 directional 
route miles), the number of low-skilled individuals who own no automobile is about 96600. 
Increasing the subway miles by 10% will increase the LFP of no-vehicle low-skilled workers by 
3 percentage points, which is 2898 workers. Assuming these workers earn an annual wage 
income of $12558 and an interest rate of 2.5%, the present value of these wage incomes for 20 
                                                          
31 These speed numbers are from the following website pages: 
http://www.nyctransitforums.com/forums/topic/17313-subway-system-average-speed-by-line/ 
http://www.wnyc.org/story/traffic-speeds-slow-nyc-wants-curb-car-service-growth/ 
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years is 559 million. If the capital cost of building one-mile subway is set as $500 million, the 
benefits in wage incomes will account for 17% of the total capital costs.32 
In addition to the low-skilled groups considered in this paper, any group of people who 
does not have access to private vehicles, because of low income or disability, can benefit from 
mass transit programs. Subway services not only help workers search for jobs and commute to 
work, it also makes people reach other places (e.g., restaurants and hospitals) more conveniently. 
What’s more, the benefits of subway systems in reducing congestion and air pollution are not 
considered in the simple cost-benefit analysis above. The benefits identified in this paper are 
therefore lower bounds.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 The average subway city has a population of 1.5 million. I assume the subway systems are operating on both directions in a 
subway tunnel. Thus, the subway directional route miles are equal to the subway tunnel miles multiplied by two. The $12558 
annual income is the average wage income of low-skilled no-vehicle workers in 2014. The capital costs of building one-mile 
subway range from $225 million per mile to $2.1 billion per mile. The ratio of benefits to costs will change if one varies the 
capital cost of building one-mile subway.  
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Figure 1: The effect of commuting speed on LFP 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for city transit services (1990, 2000, 2005-2014) 
  Transit measure Mean 
Cross 
section 
variation 
Temporal 
variation 
Inter-
quartile 
range 
Number 
of cities 
Total measure:      
Total number of bus 306 517 75 247 153 
Total subway miles 130 136 8 175 12 
Total rail miles 273 308 83 427 31 
Average measure:      
Number of bus per 1000 people 0.70 0.83 0.12 0.637 153 
Subway miles per 1000 people 0.14 0.15 0.019 0.075 12 
Rail miles per 1000 people 0.47 0.77 0.081 0.30 31 
All the transit measures are calculated using the cities that have such transit modes. The bus transit measure is total number of 
bus or number of bus per 1000 people on day of maximum service. The rail measure is a summation of commuter rail, 
hybrid rail, and light rail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Labor market outcomes for different groups of individuals (2014) 
 
Groups 
LFP 
rate 
Hours 
worked 
per week 
Commuting 
time 
(minutes) 
Hourly wage 
rate 
(dollars) 
All people (men, women) 79% 39.9 30.4 27.6 
People under poverty line 47% 31.5 30.4 11.3 
     
Men with less than a high school degree 71% 39.4 32.6 16.3 
Men with less than a high school degree, 
no vehicle 
49% 38.0 40.4 15.3 
     
Single women with less than a high 
school degree 
52% 34.3 31.8 12.5 
Single women with less than a  high 
school degree, no vehicle 
43% 33.6 39.5 12.2 
1 Calculation is for people between the ages of 25 and 60 from 2014 ACS. Hours worked per week, commuting time, and 
wage rate are summarized for employed people. 
2 The interquartile range for the city-level LFP of low-skilled men is 20%. The interquartile range for the city-level LFP of 
low-skilled men without automobiles is 32%. 
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Table 3: LFP (1 if in labor force; 0 if not) for men (reduced form OLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Men with less 
    
  
Men with a high 
   
  
Men with a 
   
  
Panel A: All Cities    
Bus per 1000 people 0.0103 0.00422 -0.00124 
 (0.0114) (0.00680) (0.00517) 
Subway miles per 1000 people 0.437* 0.181*** 0.0165 
 (0.227) (0.0528) (0.0562) 
Rail miles per 1000 people 0.0602 -0.000813 -0.00513 
 (0.0385) (0.0276) (0.0132) 
Year FE 12 12 12 
City FE 161 161 161 
Observations 169,087 619,531 403,616 
R-squared 0.272 0.176 0.075 
Panel B: Subway or Rail 
 
   
Bus per 1000 people 0.0129 0.0144 0.00172 
 (0.0136) (0.00861) (0.00760) 
Subway miles per 1000 people 0.523** 0.254*** 0.0435 
 (0.225) (0.0536) (0.0695) 
Rail miles per 1000 people 0.0722** 0.00157 -0.000717 
 (0.0303) (0.0371) (0.0177) 
Year FE 12 12 12 
City FE 36 36 36 
Observations 100,088 329,420 250,640 
R-squared 0.277 0.174 0.071 
Panel C: Subway Cities    
Bus per 1000  people 0.0314 -0.00823 -0.0146 
 (0.0217) (0.00900) (0.0106) 
Subway miles per 1000 people 0.695*** 0.244** -0.0120 
 (0.179) (0.0924) (0.0905) 
Rail miles per 1000 people 0.162 0.0351 -0.0154 
 (0.127) (0.0485) (0.0282) 
Year FE 12 12 12 
City FE 12 12 12 
Observations 72,130 224,822 163,714 
R-squared 0.278 0.170 0.072 
Panel D: Bus Only Cities    
Bus per 1000 people -0.0138 -0.00172 -0.00159 
 (0.0216) (0.0102) (0.00572) 
Subway miles per 1000 people - - - 
Rail miles per 1000 people - - - 
    
Year FE 12 12 12 
City FE 138 138 138 
Observations 68,999 290,111 152,976 
R-squared 0.268 0.180 0.082 
1 Individual characteristics, interaction terms of individual characteristics, and city time-varying attributes are controlled but 
not displayed.  
2 Standard errors are clustered at city level (in parentheses). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: First stage regression of vehicle ownership (1 if yes; 0 if no) for men with less than a high school degree 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 All Cities Subway Cities Subway or Rail Cities Bus Only Cities 
VARIABLES OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit 
         
State auto insurance  -2.21e-05 7.23e-06 -0.00028*** -0.00076*** -7.17e-05 -0.00032** -1.60e-05 0.00019 
premium (6.64e-05) (0.00017) (5.14e-05) (0.00015) (7.00e-05) (0.00015) (9.73e-05) (0.00024) 
State gasoline tax -0.00034 -0.0013 -0.0042*** -0.011*** -0.0019** -0.0058** 0.00019 0.000427 
 (0.00053) (0.0017) (0.00088) (0.0030) (0.00086) (0.0024) (0.00077) (0.0032) 
Vehicle is included in 
welfare eligibility rule  0.012 0.011 -0.166*** -0.466*** -0.0489 -0.123 0.014 0.046 
 (0.020) (0.076) (0.040) (0.152) (0.0464) (0.145) (0.018) (0.073) 
Vehicle value  
excluded from -2.23e-06 -4.82e-06 1.38e-05** 3.97e-05** 3.87e-06 9.10e-06 -2.44e-06 -4.17e-06 
welfare rule (1.75e-06) (5.41e-06) (4.67e-06) (1.59e-05) (3.94e-06) (1.16e-05) (1.72e-06) (6.19e-06) 
         
F statistics for IVs 2.65 - 69.26 - 2.74 - 0.63 - 
p-value of over 
identification test 
- - 0.23 - - - - - 
         
Year FE 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
City FE 159 159 12 12 36 36 128 128 
Observations 169,087 169,072 72,130 72,130 100,088 100,088 68,999 68,984 
R-squared 0.235 - 0.234 - 0.241 - 0.170 - 
1 Individual characteristics, interaction terms of individual characteristics, and city time-varying attributes are controlled but not displayed.  
2 Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at State level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: LFP (1 if in labor force; 0 if not) for men with less than a high school degree 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS 2SLS Heckman Selection  
VARIABLES All No 
  
Vehicle  All No 
  
Vehicle  
Panel A: All Cities       
Inverse Mill's Ratio - - - - 0.0978 -0.139*** 
 - - - - (0.076) (0.0269) 
Bus per 1000 people 0.0101 0.0483
 
-0.00188 0.00977 0.0497
 
-0.00365 
 (0.0110) (0.0219
 
(0.0105) (0.0188) (0.022) (0.0107) 
Subway miles per 1000  0.429** 1.812*
 
0.149 1.173** 1.676*
 
0.397 
people (0.199) (0.692) (0.331) (0.564) (0.716) (0.320) 
Rail miles per 1000  0.0586 0.101 0.0199 0.0550 0.0966 0.0203 
people (0.0397) (0.0802
 
(0.0289) (0.0430) (0.0795
 
(0.0296) 
At least one vehicle present 0.187**
 
- - -0.636 - - 
 (0.0210) - - (0.446) - - 
       
F statistics for IVs - - - 2.65 - - 
Year FE 1  2 12 12 12 12 12 
City FE 159 159 159 159 159 159 
Observations 169,087 49,175 119,897 169,087 49,175 119,897 
R-squared 0.299 0.306 0.214 0.263 0.306 0.214 
       
Panel B: Subway Cities      
Inverse Mill's Ratio - - - - 0.115 0.0371 
 - - - - (0.104) (0.0578) 
Bus per 1000 people 0.0273 0.0366
 
0.0466* 0.0204 0.0369
 
0.0436 
 (0.0204) (0.0066
 
(0.0252) (0.0142) (0.0068
 
(0.0244) 
Subway miles per 1000  0.655**
 
3.910*
 
0.123 0.556* 3.770*
 
0.0770 
people (0.170) (1.054) (0.324) (0.332) (1.047) (0.311) 
Rail miles per 1000  0.116 0.119 0.188 0.0368 0.0713 0.169 
people (0.121) (0.125) (0.110) (0.120) (0.111) (0.108) 
At least one vehicle present 0.138**
 
- - 0.418** - - 
 (0.0169) - - (0.190) - - 
       
F statistics for IV - - - 69.26 - - 
p-value of over 
  
- - - 0.23 - - 
Year FE 12 12 12 12 12 12 
City FE 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Observations 72,130 28,660 43,470 72,130 28,660 43,470 
R-squared 0.295 0.311 0.199 0.221 0.311 0.199 
1 Individual characteristics, interaction terms of individual characteristics, and city time-varying attributes are controlled but 
not displayed. 
2 Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at city level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 41 
 
 
Table 6: Intensive margins for men with less than a high school degree (subway cities) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS 2SLS Heckman 
 VARIABLES All All No 
  
Vehicle  All No 
  
Vehicle  
Panel A: Hourly wages       
Inverse Mill's Ratio - - - - - 0.464 0.806 
 - - - - - (0.841) (0.633) 
Bus per 1000 people 0.838 0.861 1.221 0.604 0.703* 1.284 0.524 
 (0.561) (0.512) (0.839) (0.566) (0.381) (0.855) (0.550) 
Subway miles per  5.310 5.311 5.900 4.182 -0.491 4.532 4.525 
1000 people (3.442) (3.544) (7.037) (3.575) (2.792) (7.642) (4.616) 
Rail miles per  2.645*
 
2.017* 0.338 2.188 0.249 0.357 1.371 
1000 people (1.035) (0.994) (1.975) (1.324) (1.599) (1.983) (1.478) 
At least one vehicle - 1.979*
 
- - 8.026**
 
- - 
present - (0.151) - - (2.653) - - 
Observations 48,217 48,217 15,688 32,529 47,444 15,688 32,529 
R-squared 0.147 0.160 0.108 0.153 0.035 0.108 0.153 
Panel B: Work hours       
Inverse Mill's Ratio - - - - - -
 
3.042** 
 - - - - - (0.792) (1.133) 
Bus per 1000 people -0.386 -0.414 -2.552 1.167 -0.785 -2.182 1.112 
 (2.561) (2.511) (4.100) (1.747) (1.715) (4.249) (1.582) 
Subway miles per  -5.584 -5.764 -17.28 -2.059 -8.191 -14.45 0.702 
1000 people (9.752) (9.820) (19.93) (10.44) (10.66) (19.74) (9.808) 
Rail miles per  -1.600 -1.815 5.399 -3.438 1.062 6.899 -1.125 
1000 people (1.637) (1.542) (5.816) (2.213) (0.846) (6.445) (1.197) 
At least one vehicle  - 0.600*
 
- - 10.2*** - - 
present - (0.217) - - (2.720) - - 
Observations 64,802 64,802 18,206 46,596 64,029 18,206 46,596 
R-squared 0.147 0.162 0.111 0.155 0.058 0.111 0.155 
Panel C: Commuting times       
Inverse Mill's Ratio - - - - - 6.595* 2.733* 
 - - - - - (3.218) (1.457) 
Bus per 1000 people -1.561 -1.870 -0.485 -0.325 -0.268 -0.0797 -0.328 
 (1.671) (1.682) (4.480) (1.549) (2.499) (4.369) (1.671) 
Subway miles per  -10.51 -14.13 -48.15 0.351 0.00400 -38.38 8.649 
1000 people (13.15) (14.03) (69.44) (11.65) (18.69) (69.36) (12.26) 
Rail miles per  -6.211 -5.168 7.451 -7.389 0.234 5.962 -8.001 
1000 people (5.109) (5.138) (9.270) (6.643) (2.047) (8.997) (6.798) 
At least one vehicle  - -
 
- - 10.95 - - 
present - (1.240) - - (12.90) - - 
Observations 43,190 43,190 13,045 30,145 43,190 13,045 30,145 
R-squared 0.049 0.056 0.033 0.047 0.026 0.033 0.047 
1 People who have positive wages and work hours are included in panel A. People who have positive work hours or 
commuting times are included in panel B and C, respectively. 
2 Individual characteristics, interaction terms of individual characteristics, city time-varying attributes, industry fixed effects, 
occupational earning score, 12 city fixed effects, and 12 year fixed effects are controlled but not displayed. 
3 Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at city level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The first stage F statistics for the 
2SLS regressions are 17.8, 74.2, and 29.5, respectively. All 2SLS regressions pass the over-identification test. 
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Appendix 
 
1.  Theoretical derivation of 𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅
𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅
 and 𝒅𝒅𝒖𝒖
𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅
. 
This section derives the effect of commuting speeds on hours worked (𝑑𝑑ℎ
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
) and the effect 
of commuting speeds on commuting distance (𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
) when the maximum wage rate 𝑤𝑤(𝑢𝑢) that the 
agent receives is increasing in commuting distance 𝑢𝑢 (𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢) ≥ 0, 𝑤𝑤′′(𝑢𝑢) ≤ 0). 
The agent varies ℎ and 𝑢𝑢 to maximize utility: 
max
ℎ,𝑢𝑢 𝑈𝑈(𝑇𝑇 − ℎ − 𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 ,𝑤𝑤(𝑢𝑢)ℎ) 
The F.O.C.s are: 
𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕ℎ
= −𝑈𝑈1 + 𝑈𝑈2𝑤𝑤(𝑢𝑢) = 0 
𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢
= −𝑈𝑈1/𝑠𝑠 + 𝑈𝑈2ℎ𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢) = 0 
The S.O.C.s are 𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕ℎ2
< 0, 𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2
< 0, 𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕ℎ2
𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2
> ( 𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢
)2. Solve the total derivatives with respect to 
u, ℎ, and 𝑠𝑠 for the F.O.C.s: 
𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢
𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢 + 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕ℎ2
𝑑𝑑ℎ + 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 = 0 
 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2
𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢 + 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢
𝑑𝑑ℎ + 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 = 0 
where  𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠
> 0, 𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠
> 0, and  
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𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢
= 𝑈𝑈11
𝑠𝑠
−
𝑤𝑤(𝑢𝑢)𝑈𝑈21
𝑠𝑠�����������
+(−) 𝑤𝑤′(𝑢𝑢)[ 𝑈𝑈2�𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (+) + ℎ𝑤𝑤(𝑢𝑢)𝑈𝑈22 − ℎ𝑈𝑈12�����������𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (−) ] ≶ 0  
Solve 𝑑𝑑ℎ
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
 : 
 
𝑑𝑑ℎ
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
= 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 − 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠
𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕ℎ2
𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2 − ( 𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢)2 =
𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
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Table A1: Residence status for people who live in MSAs 
Central city residence status 
People with less 
than a high school 
degree (%) 
People with a high 
school or some 
college degree (%) 
People with a 
college degree or 
above (%) 
Central city/principle city 26.6 16.8 18.3 
Outside central/principle city 33.4 40.8 42.4 
Principal city status unknown 40.1 42.4 39.3 
The results are for people between the ages of 25 and 60. 1990, 2000 Census, and 2005-2014 ACS are used for calculation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Simple correlation between transit services and city socioeconomic status in 2000 
City socioeconomic status Length of subway systems 
Length of rail 
systems 
Number of 
buses 
Proportion of low-skilled individuals 0.040 0.092 0.040 
Labor force participation rate -0.16 -0.27 -0.25 
The results are simple correlation coefficients between city-level transit services and city-level socioeconomic variables. 
The city-level socioeconomic status variables are aggregated from Census 2000 data. 
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Table A3: The length of subway systems from 1990 to 2014 (in miles) 
City 1990 2000 2005 2007 2009 2011 2014 
Los Angeles, CA 0 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 
San Francisco, CA 142 190.1 209 209 209 209 209 
Washington, DC 156.2 193.5 211.8 211.8 211.8 211.8 211.8 
Chicago, IL 191 206.3 206.3 207.8 207.8 207.8 207.8 
Atlanta, GA 67.0 92.1 96.1 96.1 96.1 96.1 96.1 
Baltimore, MD 26.6 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 
Miami, FL 42.2 42.2 45 45 45 45 45.8 
New York, NY 492.9 492.9 493.8 493.8 493.8 487.5 487.5 
Philadelphia, PA 75.8 76.1 74.9 74.9 74.9 74.9 74.9 
Boston, MA 76.7 76.3 76.3 76.3 76.3 76.3 76.3 
Cleveland, OH 38.2 38.2 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.1 
Jersey City, NJ 28.6 28.6 28.6 28.6 28.6 28.6 28.6 
 46 
 
 
 
Table A4: Exogeneity test for transit variables 
Variables Bandwidth (percentile of range) 5% 10% 20% 50% 
A: 84 cities with populations larger than 0.2 million (634 city-year observations) 
Subway miles per 1000 people -2.49 0.030 0.016 -0.038 
(2.34) (0.039) (0.037) (0.029) 
Rail miles per 1000 people -0.103 -0.017 0.013 -0.059*** 
(0.090) (0.041) (0.030) (0.019) 
Bus per 1000 people -0.39*** -0.43*** -0.47*** -0.46*** 
(0.077) (0.066) (0.045) (0.025) 
     
B: 55 cities with populations larger than 0.3 million (450 city-year observations) 
Subway miles per 1000 people -2.10 0.021 0.020 0.00024 
 (1.45) (0.024) (0.023) (0.018) 
Rail miles per 1000 people -0.054 -0.092 -0.0031 0.18*** 
 (0.13) (0.059) (0.043) (0.027) 
Bus per 1000 people 0.90 0.58 0.56 0.34 
 (2.33) (2.04) (1.30) (0.74) 
1 The tests are calculated using method of Caetano (2015). Table shows the test statistics and standard errors (in parenthesis) 
for three transit variables.  
2 I calculate average LFP of low-skilled men for each city in each year. Then apply the city-year level data to the test statistics. 
3 The 5%, 10%, 20%, and 50% percentiles are chosen as bandwidths for conducting the test, respectively. 
4 The null hypothesis is that the transit variables are exogenous after controlling for all the covariates. In most cases, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
5 For cities with population smaller than 0.3 million, the number of observations in each city is smaller. This may lead to 
inaccurate measures of LFP and rejection of null for bus in Panel A. For the same reason, I exclude cities with populations 
smaller than 0.2 million from the test. All subway and rail cities are included in the test. 
6 For cities that only have bus transit, subway miles per 1000 people and rail miles per 1000 people are set to zero. This leads 
to bunching points that are necessary for the test. 
7 Individual characteristics, interaction terms of individual characteristics, city time-varying attributes, city fixed effects, and 
year fixed effects are controlled but not displayed. 
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Table A5: Summary statistics for the instrumental variables 
  Instrumental variables Mean 
Cross 
section 
variation 
Temporal 
variation 
Number of 
states 
State auto insurance premium 
(dollars) 896 177 62 42 
State gasoline tax (cents per gallon) 21 5.2 2.4 42 
Vehicle is included in welfare 
liability rule (=1 if yes, =0 if no) 0.45 0.44 0.25 42 
Vehicle value excluded from welfare 
eligibility rule (dollars) 2616 3263 1593 42 
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Table A6: LFP (1 if in labor force; 0 if not) for men with less than a high school degree 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS 2SLS Heckman 
  VARIABLES All No 
 
Vehicle  All No 
  
Vehicle  
Panel C: Subway or Rail Cities      
Inverse Mill's Ratio - - - - 0.0971 -0.0193 
 - - - - (0.0865) (0.0301) 
Bus per 1000 people 0.0109 0.0422** 0.0003
 
0.0126 0.0392*
 
0.00112 
 (0.0124) (0.0178) (0.0158
 
(0.0146) (0.0174) (0.0159) 
Subway miles per 1000  0.501** 2.932*** -0.0460 0.674** 2.772**
 
-
 people (0.206) (0.479) (0.345) (0.279) (0.481) (0.338) 
Rail miles per 1000  0.0667** 0.127** 0.0007
 
0.0648*** 0.122** 0.00129 
people (0.0319) (0.0504) (0.0314
 
(0.0245) (0.0505) (0.0314) 
At least one vehicle  0.156*** - - 0.0929 - - 
present (0.0195) - - (0.295) - - 
       
       
F statistics for IVs - - - 2.74 - - 
Year FE 12 12 12 12 12 12 
City FE 36 36 36 36 36 36 
Observations 100,088 35,263 64,825 100,088 35,263 64,825 
R-squared 0.298 0.312 0.202 0.293 0.312 0.202 
Panel D: Bus Only Cities      
Inverse Mill's Ratio - - - - -
 
-
 
 - - - - (0.107) (0.0913) 
Bus per 1000 people -0.0116 -0.0197 -0.0160 -0.0316 -0.0375 -0.0300 
 (0.0196) (0.0493) (0.0187
 
(0.0513) (0.0486) (0.0198) 
Subway miles per 1000  - - - - - - 
people - - - - - - 
Rail miles per 1000 - - - - - - 
people - - - - - - 
At least one vehicle  0.248*** - - -1.649 - - 
present (0.0121) - - (2.486) - - 
       
F statistics for IVs - - - 0.63 - - 
Year FE 12 12 12 12 12 12 
City FE 128 128 128 128 128 128 
Observations 68,999 13,912 55,072 68,999 13,912 55,072 
R-squared 0.307 0.253 0.227 0.201 0.255 0.227 
1 Individual characteristics, interaction terms of individual characteristics, and city time-varying attributes are controlled but 
not displayed. 
2 Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at city level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A7: hourly wage for men with less than a high school degree who work 35 hours or more 
per week (subway cities) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS 2SLS Heckman Selection 
VARIABLES All All No vehicle  Vehicle  All 
No 
vehicle  Vehicle  
Inverse Mill's Ratio - - - - - 0.680 1.002 
 - - - - - (0.636) (0.632) 
Bus per 1000 people 0.690 0.721* 0.877 0.563 0.711* 1.016 0.425 
 (0.409) (0.395) (0.707) (0.446) (0.421) (0.648) (0.435) 
Subway miles per  10.60 10.62 18.26* 4.410 -48.87 16.78* 9.120 
1000 people (9.920) (9.914) (9.724) (11.46) (35.42) (9.556) (15.23) 
Rail miles per 1000  1.529 1.222 0.0315 1.249 0.753 0.707 0.723 
people (1.272) (1.283) (2.956) (1.438) (1.600) (0.706) (1.613) 
At least one vehicle  - 1.902*** - - 6.433*** - - 
present - (0.151) - - (2.020) - - 
        
Observations 39,460 39,460 12,532 26,928 39,460 12,532 26,928 
R-squared 0.175 0.187 0.134 0.178 0.134 0.134 0.178 
1 Only people who have positive wages and work 35 hours or more per week are included in regression. 
2 Individual characteristics, interaction terms of individual characteristics, city time-varying attributes, industry fixed effects, 
occupational earning score, 12 city fixed effects, and 12 year fixed effects are controlled but not displayed 
3 Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at city level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The first-stage F statistics for the 
2SLS regression is 26.2. The IVs pass the over-identification test.  
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Table A8:Robustness check: single women with less than a high school degree 
 (sample selection model results, subway cities) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 LFP Hourly wage Hours worked Commuting time 
VARIABLES No vehicle  Vehicle  
No 
vehicle  Vehicle  
No 
vehicle  Vehicle  No vehicle  Vehicle  
Inverse Mill's Ratio -0.00149 0.218*** -1.872 -1.891* -3.191 2.419 8.373 -10.22* 
 (0.0896) (0.0414) (1.445) (1.044) (2.576) (2.182) (11.53) (4.732) 
Bus per 1000 people 0.00330 0.157 0.0763 0.907 4.175* 0.484 -22.49** 17.28** 
 (0.0673) (0.0865) (0.977) (0.636) (1.922) (1.382) (9.220) (6.213) 
Subway miles per  4.290*** 1.726 16.35 5.600 -8.914 35.00 -108.8 494.1 
1000 people (0.406) (1.180) (14.04) (8.462) (40.30) (25.44) (486.6) (280.6) 
Rail miles per 1000  0.275 -0.0752 1.859 2.480 -0.233 8.577 -16.71 -10.23 
people (0.160) (0.0572) (3.064) (2.661) (5.848) (7.425) (10.92) (15.39) 
         
Year FE 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
City FE 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Industry FE - - 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Observations 21,143 15,206 8,539 8,682 9,000 9,247 6,829 7,564 
R-squared 0.152 0.123 0.108 0.135 0.051 0.054 0.051 0.077 
1 Only people who are employed are included in regression for columns 3-8. 
2  Individual characteristics, interaction terms of individual characteristics, and city time-varying attributes are controlled but not displayed. 
3 Industry fixed effects are included in columns 3-8. Occupation earnings score is included in columns 3-4. 
4 Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at city level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A9:Robustness check: LFP (1 if in labor force; 0 if not) for men with less than a high 
school degree (using aggregate transit service levels, subway cities) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS 2SLS Heckman Selection  
VARIABLES All No vehicle  Vehicle  All 
No 
vehicle  Vehicle  
Inverse Mill's Ratio - - - - 0.0979 0.0515 
 - - - - (0.0948) (0.0622) 
log(number of bus) 0.0404 0.0348 0.0516 0.0373 0.0351 0.0467 
 (0.0267) (0.0229) (0.0409) (0.0238) (0.0245) (0.0396) 
log(subway miles) 0.250** 0.948*** 0.0173 0.210* 0.875*** -0.00758 
 (0.113) (0.107) (0.0970) (0.110) (0.117) (0.0877) 
log(rail miles) -0.000852 -0.00835 0.00578 0.000739 -0.00636 0.00680 
 (0.00523) (0.00499) (0.00403) (0.00438) (0.00591) (0.00463) 
At least one vehicle 0.138*** - - 0.455*** - - 
present (0.0169) - - (0.171) - - 
       
F statistics for IV - - - 13.75 - - 
p-value of over 
identification test 
- - - 0.19 - - 
Year FE 12 12 12 12 12 12 
City FE 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Observations 72,130 28,660 43,470 72,130 28,660 43,470 
R-squared 0.295 0.311 0.199 0.201 0.311 0.199 
1 Individual characteristics, interaction terms of individual characteristics, and city time-varying attributes are controlled but 
not displayed. 
2 Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at city level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A10: Robustness check: LFP (1 if in labor force; 0 if not) for men with less than a high 
school degree (excluding New York City, subway cities) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS 2SLS Heckman Selection  
VARIABLES All No vehicle  Vehicle  All No vehicle  Vehicle  
Inverse Mill's Ratio - - - - -0.344 0.269** 
 - - - - (0.211) (0.0942) 
Bus per 1000 people 0.0320 0.0206 0.0477 0.0116 0.0408 0.0242 
 (0.0286) (0.0254) (0.0372) (0.0349) (0.0377) (0.0332) 
Subway miles per  0.597** 3.736*** 0.122 0.647** 3.881*** 0.0156 
1000 people (0.196) (0.982) (0.334) (0.304) (0.977) (0.294) 
Rail miles per 1000  0.131 0.0589 0.151 0.0172 0.150 0.0856 
people (0.127) (0.138) (0.108) (0.106) (0.197) (0.0900) 
At least one vehicle  0.162*** - - 0.598*** - - 
present (0.0189) - - (0.215) - - 
       
F statistics for IV - - - 12.19 - - 
p-value of over 
identification test 
- - - 0.34 - - 
Year FE 12 12 12 12 12 12 
City FE 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Observations 44,712 12,254 32,458 44,712 12,254 32,458 
R-squared 0.313 0.317 0.214 0.152 0.317 0.215 
1 Individual characteristics, interaction terms of individual characteristics, and city time-varying attributes are controlled but 
not displayed. 
2 Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at city level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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1.          Introduction 
Congestion on urban road systems has been rising in U.S. cities in recent years. The 
annual delay from congestion on urban road systems cost commuters in 471 urban areas in 2014 
roughly 42 hours, about the equivalent of one week of work.  That was up sharply from 1982 for 
which the corresponding estimate was just 18 hours.33 Congestion is also much worse in large 
cities. The annual delay per auto commuter for the 15 largest urban areas in 2014 amounted to 63 
hours.  
Given the extensive cost associated with urban congestion, not surprisingly, congestion 
has been the focus of numerous studies as well as policy initiatives intended to alleviate 
congestion. One policy response has been to “build your way out of congestion” by expanding 
road systems. However, this approach is not effective to reduce congestion because people 
respond to expansions to the road network by traveling more miles.34 Duranton and Turner 
(2011) find the elasticity of highway traffic with respect to highway capacity is 1.03, confirming 
the fundamental law of road congestion. This law, which Downs (1962) proposed 55 years ago, 
states that traffic increases one for one with roads and building more roads will not reduce 
congestion. Hsu and Zhang (2014) show that this law holds for highways in Japan.  
Public transit is another proposed method to alleviate road congestion. The American 
Public Transit Association claims “Without public transportation, congestion would have 
increased by 27 percent”.35 Several studies (Nelson et al., 2007; Parry and Small, 2009; 
Anderson, 2014) find subway and light rail systems reduce travel times on roads in Los Angeles 
and Washington, DC. Duranton and Turner (2011) find alternative evidence showing that the 
                                                          
33 The congestion cost estimates in this paragraph are from a report by Texas A&M Transportation Institutes (David et al., 2015). 
34 See Goodwin (1996) and Cervero (2002) for reviews. 
35 http://www.apta.com/resources/reportsandpublications/documents/congestion.pdf 
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effect of bus transit on highway usage is not significant. They conclude the transit system does 
not help reduce congestion on roads. Thus, the current literature has not reached consensus on 
the role of public transit in congestion relief.  
This paper investigates the role of subway systems in congestion relief by studying the 
effects of subway expansions on passenger miles traveled (PMT) in subways and vehicle miles 
traveled (VMT) on roads in the US. Conceptually, adding more subways can affect traffic in 
three ways. First, increasing access will generate higher usage and ridership of subway systems. 
Second, better subway services may motivate some passengers to substitute from other modes, 
e.g., driving. Third, subway systems may change the distribution of economic activities and 
decentralize cities (Gonzalez-Navarro and Turner, 2016).36 A more dispersed city configuration 
leads to longer trips. All three impacts boost subway ridership. The second channel reduces 
traffic on roads while the third effect may cause more congestion on roads.  
The empirical results reported in this paper indicate that the elasticity of subway PMT 
with respect to subway miles is 1.27, implying that the fundamental law of road congestion 
applies to subway systems. Subway expansions also have substitution and growth effects on road 
traffic. A 10 percent expansion of subway systems reduces contemporaneous traffic on ring 
highways and non-highway arterial roads by 0.7 percent and 1.4 percent, respectively. With a 
three-year lag, a 10 percent increase in subway capacity increases VMT on ring highways by 0.4 
percent and increase VMT on radial highways by 1.7 percent. The reason for the growth effects 
might be that subway systems decentralize cities. Taking both the substitution and growth effects 
into consideration, building more subways does not mitigate congestion in subways and 
                                                          
36 The effect of subways here are similar to highways. Baum-Snow (2007) finds that highways decentralize cities. 
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congestion on radial highways, but relieves congestion on ring highways and non-highway 
arterial roads.  
This study contributes to current literature in several ways. To the author’s knowledge, 
this is the first paper that confirms the fundamental law of road congestion applies to subway 
systems. Given a fixed number of passengers, the comfort level in subway stations and subway 
cars increases after subway expansions. The higher comfort level will attract more riders from 
other travelling modes. A conceptual model shows that in equilibrium, the comfort level should 
be the same as the comfort level before the expansions of subway systems. This means subway 
PMT should increase at least the same percentages as subway miles. Robustness checks show 
that this law also applies to light rail and bus systems. The existence of fundamental law of 
public transit congestion indicates that providing more transit services will not mitigate 
congestion in public transit. This law also helps predict ridership changes after adding more 
public transit services.  
Second, this paper reconciles the inconsistent evidence about effects of transit on road 
congestion. Notably, subway expansions only reduce congestion on roads that are close 
substitutes to subways. For example, non-highway arterial roads have lower speed limits and 
usually serve local urban neighborhoods, so they share similar traits with subways in travel 
speeds and geographic coverages. The empirical results suggest subway expansions relieves 
congestion and have the largest effects on VMT on non-highway arterial roads. In that respect, 
the empirical findings support the positive role of subway systems in reducing congestion.  
A third and a new contribution of this paper is the growth effects that added subways 
have on VMT on interstate highways, especially for radial highways. This positive effect of 
subway systems on highway traffic echoes Gonzalez-Navarro and Turner’s (2016) finding that 
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subway expansions decentralize cities. Subway extensions have substitution effects that reduce 
traffic on roads and have growth effects that increase congestion on roads. Both effects should be 
considered in evaluating the role of subways in road congestion relief.  
Finally, I find that a geographic coverage effect is necessary for the fundamental law of 
highway/subway congestion to hold. The expansions of the subway or highway systems not only 
add more capacities by building more rail lines or road lanes, but also allow people to reach more 
places. The geographic coverage effect measures the changes in traffic because of extensions of 
highway or subway geographic networks.37 A conceptual model is proposed to study the 
influences of subway expansions on congestion. With the empirical results, the conceptual model 
indicates that the geographic coverage effect must exist and there are welfare improvements 
associated with subway or highway constructions. These results are consistent with the finding of 
Hsu and Zhang (2014) that coverage effect exists in the highway expansions in Japan. 
This paper provides further evidence for the policy debates about the viability of subway 
systems. Subway construction is controversial because of its enormous cost. As an example, the 
cost of building the Second Avenue Subway in New York City, the first phase of which opened 
on January 1, 2017, is estimated to be roughly 2.1 billion US dollars per mile.38 Ticket fare 
revenue also typically does not cover operating expenses for subway systems (APTA, 2014). In 
2014, for example, fare revenue only covered 41 percent of operating expenses for the New York 
City subway system (National Transit Database). Most capital and operation funding gaps are 
filled by government subsidies. Some studies find that these subsidies are too high and cannot 
pass the cost-benefit analysis even after accounting for benefits in congestion savings (Stopher, 
                                                          
37 The geographic coverage effect is zero if the expansion does not change the geographic coverage of highway or subway 
systems. If traffic does not respond to the changes of geographic coverages of subway or highway systems, the geographic 
coverage effect will also be zero. 
38 https://www.thoughtco.com/rail-transit-projects-costs-2798796 
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2004; Winston and Maheshri, 2007). However, other studies conclude subways have multiple 
benefits, e.g., reducing congestion (Anderson, 2014) and air pollution (Gendron-Carrier et al., 
2017), and the government subsidies are welfare improving (Parry and Small, 2009; Litman, 
2015). The identified effects of subways on road congestion relief in this paper should be 
considered in evaluating subway projects in future.  
Among all public transit modes, subway should have the largest effect on road 
congestion. Although both subway and light rail do not interfere with road traffic, the speed of 
subway is much faster than light rail. A subway train can hold much more passengers than a light 
rail train can. Compared with changes in light rail and bus services, subway expansions have the 
largest potential to alleviate road congestion.  
 To identify the effects of subway expansions on congestion, a panel dataset for 10 (14) 
MSAs (cities) in US from 1991 to 2014 is constructed. With the information on VMT, PMT, 
road capacities, subway route miles, and population, both level regressions and first-difference 
models are employed to estimate the elasticity of PMT and the cross-elasticities of VMT with 
respect to subway route miles. To solve the reverse causality and omitted variable problem, fixed 
effect models and instrumental variable method are used to identify the causal effects. Following 
Baum-Snow (2007) and Duranton and Turner (2011), highway plans from 1947 serves as an 
instrument for the current highway system. In the first-difference model, long-lagged subway 
line length and the assignment of transportation committee members in Congress instrument for 
the change of subway systems, as in Gonzalez-Navarro and Turner (2016) and Knight (2005). 
All the model estimates show quantitatively similar results. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 uses a conceptual model to 
predict the influence of transit expansions on congestion. Section 3 introduces the empirical 
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methods. Section 4 describes data source and summary statistics. Empirical results are in Section 
5. Section 6 discusses the implications of empirical findings. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.          A conceptual model of subway systems and road congestion 
Building on the work of Holden (1989) and Hsu and Zhang (2014), a conceptual model is 
constructed to predict the effects of subway expansions on congestion. The model also helps 
study geographic coverage effect and welfare implications. This model can be applied in any 
context where one of the traveling alternatives is expanded. 
Suppose people in a city can travel by two alternatives: 𝑟𝑟 and 𝑑𝑑, representing subway and 
highway driving, respectively. Assume the speed of subway systems is a constant and is not 
correlated with passenger volume.39 The comfort of sitting in a car is also not determined by 
number of vehicles on road.40 
The comfort in subways or the speed of driving on highways (𝑠𝑠) is a function of ridership 
𝑄𝑄 and capacity 𝐾𝐾: 
𝑠𝑠 = 𝑔𝑔(𝐾𝐾,𝑄𝑄) = � 𝑏𝑏               𝑄𝑄 ≤ 𝑄𝑄�(𝐾𝐾)
𝑓𝑓(𝐾𝐾,𝑄𝑄)    𝑄𝑄 > 𝑄𝑄�(𝐾𝐾) 
𝑄𝑄�(𝐾𝐾) is a threshold above which the comfort in subways or the speed on highways starts to 
decrease with ridership.41 When ridership is below this threshold, the comfort of taking subways 
or the speed on highways is a constant. Given 𝐾𝐾, the relationship between comfort/speed (𝑠𝑠) and 
ridership (𝑄𝑄) is illustrated in Figure 1. The partial derivative of the threshold with respect to 
                                                          
39 Subway operation needs to follow the predetermined time schedule. The on-time rate is above 80% for New York Subway in 
2013. Equipment problems, employee errors, track repairs, and right-of-way conflicts cause two thirds of the delays. Thus, 
passenger volume is not a main driver of speed (see  
http://www.citylab.com/commute/2015/08/charting-the-new-york-subways-plunging-on-time-rate/401756/ ). 
40 According to a report of Department of Energy (2012), the average occupancy rate of cars in 2009 is about 1.55. It is not 
crowded inside a car. 
41 People get annoyed when there is no vacant seat or too crowded in subway cars or subway stations. 
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capacity is positive, i.e., 𝜕𝜕 𝑄𝑄� (𝐾𝐾)/𝜕𝜕𝐾𝐾 > 0. This means the expansions of subway or highway 
capacity lead to a higher threshold of congestion. The highway usage is measured by VMT, and 
subway ridership is represented by PMT. 
The indirect utility of riding subways or driving on highways is assumed to be a function 
of speed/comfort (𝑠𝑠) and coverage 𝑙𝑙. In principle, capacity expansion of a road/subway system 
may take either the form of lane/rail expansion or increasing the coverage by extending the 
length of existing routes or by creating a new route. The expansions of the subway or highway 
systems not only add more rail tracks or road lanes, but also allow people to reach more places. 
This geographic coverage effect or network effect is not captured by speed/comfort 𝑠𝑠. 𝑙𝑙 measures 
the geographic scope of highway or subway systems. For driving, the indirect utility is 
represented by 𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑,  𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑) where 𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑 and 𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 denote the driving speeds and coverage of highway 
networks. Similarly, the indirect utility for subways is represented by 𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟 ,  𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟) where 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟 and 𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟 
are the comfort level in subways and coverage of subway systems. The marginal utilities with 
respect to 𝑠𝑠 and 𝑙𝑙 are positive (𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈/𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 > 0,𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈/𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙 > 0).42 
In equilibrium, people will arbitrage between the two modes and the utility of traveling 
by any of the two methods should be the same: 𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟0,  𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟) = 𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑0,  𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑) = 𝑈𝑈0. 
Figure 2 shows that the initial equilibrium is at A. For a fixed number of ridership, the 
horizontal axis measures how the trips are allocated between the two travel alternatives. From O 
to P, the proportion of trips on highways increases and the share of trips in subways decreases. 
An implicit assumption is that subways and highways are close substitutes. The vertical axis is 
the utility level.43 The utility of using highways or subways is decreasing after ridership reaches 
                                                          
42 The assumption 𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈/𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙 > 0 can be tested. See Section 2.1. 
43 The vertical axis in Figure 2 can also be interpreted as marginal utility. At equilibrium, the marginal utility of using either of 
the two alternatives is the same.  
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the congestion threshold 𝑄𝑄�(𝐾𝐾). At point A, both highways and subways are congested and the 
utility of using any of the two modes is the same.44 As the analysis is symmetric for highway 
expansions, the investigation below only focuses on the effects of building more subways. 
 
2.1        Adding subway capacity without changing geographic coverage 
Assume, for now, the subway expansion only increases capacity but does not change the 
geographic coverage. This means the coverage effect does not exist. A subway expansion will 
increase the congestion threshold as 𝜕𝜕 𝑄𝑄� (𝐾𝐾)/𝜕𝜕𝐾𝐾 > 0. The utility of subway riding moves to 
𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟′ ,  𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟), and the system jumps to B on the graph in Figure 2, where the utility of subway riding 
or highway usage is higher than 𝑈𝑈0.  
As the utility at B is higher, the induced demand literature (Downs, 1962; Goodwin, 
1996; Cervero, 2002) documents that people have two possible responses. First, people using 
other commuting routes (e.g., local roads) may switch to subways and highways. The number of 
people commuting by highway or subway grows. The second possibility is that people using 
highways and subways will do so more frequently, leaving the number of commuters unchanged, 
but increasing the number of trips.    
Each of these cases increases total ridership. The horizontal axis extends on both sides 
and both utility curves shift outward. As the ridership of subways and highways increases, the 
utilities decline gradually. This process may continue until the extreme case occurs at C where 
𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟∗,  𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟) = 𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑∗ ,  𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑) = 𝑈𝑈0. Therefore, 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟∗ = 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟0  and 𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑∗ = 𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑0. The comfort levels within a 
subway car or station and speeds on highways are the same before and after the change of 
                                                          
44 The case that only one mode is congested is less interesting. The fundamental law of congestion will fail in this case, and this is 
not consistent with empirical results in this paper that the law holds for both highways and subways. Hsu and Zhang (2014) have 
detailed theoretical analysis for the case that one mode is not congested. 
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subway extent. If subway expansions remove some people from highways, commuters using 
other modes will take their place. The empirical implication is that subway expansions have no 
effect on highway VMT. The fundamental law of transit congestion holds as the subway 
extension accompanies the same percentage increase of PMT.  
It is also possible, however, that the system eventually arrives at D in Figure 2, where 
𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟∗,  𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟) = 𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑∗ ,  𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑) > 𝑈𝑈0, 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟∗ > 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟0, and 𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑∗ > 𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑0.  At D, subways reduce congestion on 
highways. The fundamental law of subway congestion fails because the increase in PMT is less 
than the change of subway extent.  
In reality, most subway expansions will extend the geographic coverage of subway 
systems. However, subway traffic will not respond to the changes in geographic coverage when 
𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈/𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙 = 0. The analysis above also applies to the case that subway expansions change the 
geographic coverage of subway systems but agents’ utility levels do not depend on geographic 
coverage (𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈/𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙 = 0).  
 
2.2        Subway expansions extending geographic coverage 
If coverage effect exists, the subway expansion not only increases capacity, but also 
increases the geographic coverage.45 The same subway expansion leads to a larger increase in 
utility at B on the graph in Figure 3: 𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟′ ,  𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟′ ) > 𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟′ ,  𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟). What follows is the same as the 
situation where no coverage effect exists. The extreme case is at C: 𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟∗′,  𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟′ ) = 𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑∗ ,  𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑) =
𝑈𝑈0 = 𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟∗,  𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟). The coverage effect implies 𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟′ > 𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟, which further indicates 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟∗′ < 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟∗ = 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟0. The 
comfort of subway riding after the expansion is worse than the initial level. This means a 1 
percent expansion of subway extent leads to more than a 1 percent increase in PMT. The 
                                                          
45 I assume 𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈/𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙 > 0 in Section 2.2. The analysis in Section 2.1 applies to the case that 𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈/𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙 = 0.  
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elasticity of PMT with respect to subway capacity is larger than one, and the fundamental law 
holds.46 The subway expansion has no impact on highway usage.  
If the new equilibrium is at D, the fundamental law of subway congestion can still hold 
because of the geographic coverage effect. At D, 𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟∗′,  𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟′ ) > 𝑈𝑈0 = 𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟0,  𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟). Because of 𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟′ >
𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟, it is possible that 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟∗′ ≤ 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟0. The elasticity of subway ridership with respect to subway 
expansions can be equal or greater than one. At D, adding more subway lines reduces VMT on 
highways because 𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑∗ > 𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑0. The fundamental law of subway congestion will fail at D if 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟∗′ > 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟0. 
Whether the law holds or not is an empirical question.  
Table 1 summarizes the analysis above. Which of the four cases is true depends on the 
empirical evidence. In what follows, the effects of subway expansions on subway riding (PMT) 
and highway usage (VMT) are estimated. The estimated elasticities support case four, indicating 
that the geographic coverage effect exists and the utilities at the new equilibrium are improved. 
This also suggests that utility increases with geographic coverage (𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈/𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙 > 0) and ridership 
responds to the extensions of geographic coverage of subway systems. 
 
2.3        The growth effects of subway expansions 
The analysis above applies to the substitution effects of subway expansions. Subway 
expansions may also redistribute economic activities, decentralize cities, and increase traveling 
demand and length of trips. This explains the positive effects of subway expansions on highway 
usage. Compared with the substitution effects, the growth effects may occur after a longer period 
as the economic activities cannot relocate instantaneously. It is easier for commuters to switch 
between different modes, but it takes more time to decentralize cities. The growth effects may 
                                                          
46 The fundamental law of highway congestion holds when the elasticity of VMT with respect to lane miles is equal or larger than 
one. 
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increase total ridership after a longer period and shift utility curves out further in Figure 2 and 
Figure 3. The substitution effects of subway expansions will be weakened by the growth effects. 
Empirically, past subway expansions can have a positive effect on current highway traffic.  
 
3.         Empirical strategy 
The main goal is to estimate the elasticities of ridership with respect to highway and 
subway capacities. Consider the ridership 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 of city or MSA 𝑝𝑝 in year 𝑡𝑡 as a function of highway 
capacity 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗, subway capacity 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗, and city characteristics 𝑋𝑋𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗: 
 
            ln(𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) = 𝐴𝐴0 + 𝜌𝜌𝐻𝐻𝑄𝑄 ln(𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) + 𝜌𝜌𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄 ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) + 𝐴𝐴1𝑋𝑋𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 + 𝜖𝜖𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 (1) 
𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 can denote either VMT or PMT. 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 is highway lane miles, and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 represents directional 
route miles of subway systems.47 𝑋𝑋𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 denotes population and other possible control variables. 𝜖𝜖𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 
is an error term. 
To test whether subway (highway) extensions has growth effects on highway (subway) 
traffic after a longer period, several 3-year lagged capacity variables (ln�𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−3� and ln�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−3�) 
can be included in regression. Economic activities are likely to have full response to changes of 
infrastructure in 3 years. Including a 4-year lag instead of a 3-year lag results in qualitatively 
similar results (see Table A4). 𝜋𝜋𝐻𝐻
𝑄𝑄 and 𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝑄𝑄 measure the growth effects of subway/highway 
expansions: 
             ln(𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) = 𝐴𝐴0 + 𝜌𝜌𝐻𝐻𝑄𝑄 ln(𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) + 𝜌𝜌𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄 ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) + 𝐴𝐴1𝑋𝑋𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 + 𝜋𝜋𝐻𝐻𝑄𝑄 ln�𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−3� +
𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝑄𝑄 ln�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−3� + 𝜖𝜖𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 
(2) 
                                                          
47 Directional route miles refer to the mileage in each direction over which public transportation vehicles travel. 
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For conciseness, I focus on Equation (1) to discuss the identification strategies. The same 
identification argument applies to Equation (2). The unbiased identification of the elasticities (𝜌𝜌𝐻𝐻
𝑄𝑄 
and 𝜌𝜌𝑆𝑆
𝑄𝑄) requires exogeneity: 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗, 𝜖𝜖𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ) = 0 and 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗, 𝜖𝜖𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ) = 0. These conditions do not 
hold in the presence of reverse causality and omitted variable bias, both of which may be present 
in Equation (1) and (2). It is possible that cities choose to build more subways (or highways) in 
response to higher travel demand or positive population shocks. Reverse causality biases 
upwards the elasticity of subway PMT (or highway VMT) with respect to subway miles 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗. 
Omitted variables lead to inconsistent elasticity estimates when the ridership variable 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 and 
capacity variables, 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 or 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗, are correlated with unobserved factors. 
There are several methods to solve these endogeneity problems. The first strategy is to 
include city fixed effects 𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆 and year fixed effects 𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗.  
            ln(𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) = 𝐴𝐴0 + 𝜌𝜌𝐻𝐻𝑄𝑄 ln(𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) + 𝜌𝜌𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄 ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) + 𝐴𝐴1𝑋𝑋𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 + 𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆 + 𝜖𝜖𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 (3) 
City time-invariant characteristics are removed in Equation (3) and the identification comes from 
the changes of highway and subway systems over time. The city fixed effects can reduce much 
of the correlation between capacity variables and the error term.  
A similar method is taking the first difference of the above equation to eliminate the city 
fixed effect term. In the first-difference model, one can still include city fixed effects (𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆), or 
equivalently, city specific trend (𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) in the level regressions. These fixed effects in the first 
difference model account for the unobserved city specific time-varying factors. Equation (4) and 
(5) are equivalent. Considering people may take time to respond to changes of infrastructure, a 
three-year first difference48 is imposed in order to have larger variations and smaller noises in the 
                                                          
48 ∆ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) = ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) − ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆.𝑗𝑗−3). If the subway expansion happens in December, a one-year first difference does not fully capture 
peoples’ response because this response can last several months.  
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differenced covariates. The empirical results are robust to a one-year first-difference model and 
5-year first-difference model (see Table A1 and Table A2). 
             ∆ln(𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) = 𝜌𝜌𝐻𝐻𝑄𝑄∆ ln(𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) + 𝜌𝜌𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄 ∆ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) + 𝐴𝐴1∆𝑋𝑋𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 + 𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆 + ∆𝜖𝜖𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 (4) 
              ln(𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗)    = 𝐴𝐴0 + 𝜌𝜌𝐻𝐻𝑄𝑄 ln(𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) + 𝜌𝜌𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄 ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) + 𝐴𝐴1𝑋𝑋𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 + 𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆 + 𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 (5) 
The last method is finding valid instrumental variables (IVs) for ln (𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) and ln (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) in 
level regressions, or for ∆ln (𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) and ∆ln (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) in first-difference regressions. Baum-Snow (2007) 
and others (Duranton and Turner, 2011; Duranton and Turner, 2012) have used the highway plan 
in year 1947 as an instrument for the current highway network. This instrument is valid because 
this historical plan was proposed to serve military purpose and to connect cities. The instrument 
is not correlated with local VMT or PMT. Thus, the highway plan in year 1947 is used as an 
instrument for the highway lane miles (𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗). 
Valid instruments for ln (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) do not appear in the literature. Instead, this paper introduces 
long lagged subway directional route miles and whether a city had a representative on the 
transportation committee of Congress as two valid instruments for the change of subways 
(∆ln (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗)).  
Suppose the following process determines the supply of subway systems: 
           ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 ln�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−1� + 𝛼𝛼2𝑋𝑋𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆 + 𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝜗𝜗𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 (6) 
Take the first difference: 
            ∆ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) = 𝛼𝛼1 ∆ln�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−1� + 𝛼𝛼2∆𝑋𝑋𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆 + ∆𝜗𝜗𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 (7) 
The lagged variable ∆ln�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−1� is a good instrument for ∆ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗) if 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝�∆ ln�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−1� ,∆𝜖𝜖 �𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 = 0, 
or in words, the lagged changes in subways are uncorrelated with the current changes of error 
term. Since ∆ln�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−1� = ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−1) − ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−2) and the subway levels are higly correlated, as is 
standard in dynamic panel model estimation, the same logic that justifies using ∆ln�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−1� as an 
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instrument also justifies using the component level or the lagged component level as an 
instrument. The discussion above indicates a strategy that using previous subway system extent 
as an instrument for current subway change. The long-lagged subway length is predetermined, so 
it does not correlate with the current error term. High levels of subway services in the past should 
predict a smaller growth rate of subway systems today. If the instrument is denoted by ln (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−𝑘𝑘), 
𝑘𝑘 is chosen to yield a strong first stage and ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−𝑘𝑘) should be a lag of ∆ln�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗�. For the three-
year change ∆ln�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗� = ln�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗� − ln�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−3�, I choose ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−5) as an instrument. For the third 
lag of the three-year change ∆ln�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−3� = ln�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−3� − ln�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−6�, I choose ln(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗−7) as an 
instrument. Gonzalez-Navarro and Turner (2016) use long lagged subway extent as an 
instrument for the changes of subway systems in studying the causal effect of subways on city 
growth. Results in Table 4 show that longer subway route miles in the past predict smaller 
growth of subway miles in subsequent periods.  
The second instrument for current subway changes comes from the political economy 
literature. Knight (2002) uses the political power of state congressional delegations as 
instruments for federal grants to study whether federal funding crowds out state government 
spending. In a subsequent paper, Knight (2005) finds congressional districts that have 
representatives sitting on the transportation committee receive higher funding for highway 
project than districts that do not. Subway extensions usually cost significant amounts of money 
and federal funding is a crucial source of funding. If a city has a representative sitting on the 
transportation committee of the House of Representatives, it is more likely to receive federal 
funding to expand the subway system in the following years. Thus, whether the city had a 
representative on transportation committee of Congress seven years earlier is chosen as an 
instrumental variable for the current subway change, as the construction of subways takes many 
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years. 49  This instrument should predict the changes of subways, but it is not correlated with 
current ridership in cities because the political process determines the committee assignment of 
representatives. Compared with the lagged subway length, this political instrument has more 
economic meaning and is less mechanical. The results from the first stage regressions in Table 4 
confirm the significantly positive influence of political power on subway length.  
To sum up, Equation (4) is the preferred first-difference-fixed-effect model that controls 
both time-invariant city characteristics and time-varying city specific trends. The lagged subway 
extent and transportation committee assignment can be employed as instruments for the changes 
in subway miles in Equation (4). The instrumental variable method serves as a robustness check 
for the first-difference-fixed-effect model.  
 
4.          Data 
The information on subway service and performance is from National Transit Database 
(NTD). The NTD was established by Congress to be the nation’s primary source for information 
and statistics on the transit systems in the United States. Over 660 transit providers currently 
report to the NTD through the Internet-based reporting system. The NTD data provides annual 
information on transit facilities, service levels, funding sources, revenues, and costs at Urbanized 
Area (UZA) and city level throughout the period 1991-2014. The NTD data also reports the 
directional route miles and passenger miles traveled for subway systems in different cities.  
                                                          
49 The transportation committee assignment seven years ago also yields the strongest first stage. 
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There are 14 cities,50 or 10 MSAs,51 that have subway systems in the continental US.52 
All subway cities except Cleveland, OH, Lindenwold, NJ, and Staten Island, NY have 
experienced changes to their subway systems during the period of 1991-2014. Washington, DC, 
Chicago, IL, Los Angeles, CA, San Francisco, CA, and Atlanta, GA have had sizeable 
extensions of their subway networks between 1991 and 2014.53 In estimating the elasticity of 
PMT with respect to subway route miles, city level, instead of MSA level, information is used 
because the sample size is larger. However, MSA level regressions show qualitatively similar 
results (see Table A3 in Appendix).  
The level and performance data on highways and non-highway arterial roads is from the 
universe sample of Highway Performance Monitoring System (HPMS), which is collected by the 
Federal Highway Administration in the US Department of Transportation (DOT). The HPMS 
data is available annually since 1981. This database contains information on length (in miles), 
number of lanes, and the number of vehicles per lane per day for all segments of highways and 
non-highway arterial roads in each county. Following the method of Duranton and Turner 
(2011), this information is used to calculate road lane miles and VMT. Lane miles is equal to 
number of lanes multiplied by segment length of roads. VMT is the product of lane miles and 
annual average number of vehicles per lane per day. 
                                                          
50 Los Angeles, CA, Oakland (San Francisco), CA, Washington, DC, Miami, FL, Chicago, IL, Boston, MA, New York, NY, 
Staten Island, NY, Baltimore, MD, Jersey City, NJ, Cleveland, OH, Philadelphia, PA, Atlanta, GA, Lindenwold, NJ. NTD 
reports the subway information of New York City and Staten Island separately, and I treat Staten Island as a city here. The 
subway in Staten Island is not connected to NYC subway directly. These 14 cities are in 10 MSAs.  
51 New York, NY, Staten Island, NY, Jersey City, NJ are in one MSA. Washington, DC and Baltimore, MD are in one MSA. 
Philadelphia, PA and Lindenwold, NJ are in one MSA. Each of the rest cities are in one MSA. 
52 The subway systems in this paper refer to heavy rail systems in NTD. Part of a heavy rail system can be above ground. The 
heavy rail systems typically have higher speeds and capacities. See the following link for comparisons between heavy rail and 
light rail: http://designlightrail.com/lightrailcompare/ 
53 Washington, DC had gradually increased its total subway directional route miles by 56 miles between 1991 and 2005. Chicago 
built 15-miles subway between 1990 and 2000. Los Angeles built 31.9 directional route miles subway between 1993 and 2000. 
San Francisco and Oakland extended subway system by 67 directional route miles between 1995 and 2003. Atlanta saw an 
increase of 25 miles from 1993 to 1999. 
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The HPMS data displays the route number of interstate highways. To differentiate 
different types of highways, the three-digit interstate highways (e.g., 690, 481) are called ring 
highways, which are circumferential or spur highways that principally serve local urban areas. 
Similarly, radial highways denote the one- or two-digit interstate highways (e.g., 90, 81) that 
connect different MSAs. The definition of interstate highways in this paper include both ring 
highways and radial highways. The non-highway arterial roads include non-highway principal 
arterials and minor arterials. These roads typically serve major centers of MSAs and are not 
access-controlled.54 The 1999 Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) definitions are used to link 
the counties to MSAs. The HPMS data also report the urban/rural status of each segment of 
roads. On average, 90 percent of the interstate highway traffic (VMT) in MSAs occurs in the 
urban portion of MSAs. Because all subway systems are in urban areas, the road segments in the 
urban portion of each MSA are used to calculate road capacity and performance variables. To 
maintain comparability between the results in this paper with the results in Duranton and Turner 
(2011), the MSA level information is used to estimate the cross-elasticity of road VMT with 
respect to subway route miles.  
The annual county and city population data is from the Census. MSA populations come 
from the summation of county populations. Historical Congressional committee assignments of 
representatives are from Stewart and Woon (2016). A congressional districts’ map is overlaid 
with a map of cities to obtain correspondence between cities and congressional districts. This 
crosswalk helps calculate whether a city has had a representative on the House transportation 
committee in each year.  
                                                          
54 Access-controlled means limited or no access to adjacent property. Interstate highways in US are access-controlled. A detailed 
description of the functional class of roads:  
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/planning/processes/statewide/related/highway_functional_classifications/section03.cfm 
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Table 2 displays the summary statistics of PMT, VMT, and capacity measures of 
subways, highways, and non-highway arterial roads. For all variables except transportation 
committee assignment, the temporal variation is much smaller than the standard deviation and 
cross section variation. The VMT is far larger than PMT, confirming that transit ridership only 
accounts for a small fraction of total miles traveled. The length of ring highways is about 42 
percent of the total interstate highway length, indicating the radial highways account for 58 
percent of the total interstate highway lane miles.  
 
 
5.          Results  
Level regressions with fixed effects, first-difference models with and without fixed 
effects, and 2SLS are used to study the elasticities of subway and highway ridership with respect 
to subway route miles.  
 
5.1        The elasticity of subway PMT with respect to subway route miles 
5.1.1     OLS and fixed effect models 
Table 3 displays the regression results obtained by estimating the elasticity of subway 
PMT with respect to subway route miles and road lane miles for three different types of roads in 
14 cities.55 Specifically, the regression includes interstate highway lane miles, ring highway lane 
miles, and non-highway arterial road lane miles as regressors to study the substitution effects of 
                                                          
55 All standard errors are robust to heterogeneity and serial correlation. I also generate the standard errors using a wild cluster 
bootstrap method developed by Cameron et al. (2008). It turns out the bootstrapped standard errors (1000 repetitions) are 
generally no larger than the robust standard errors. Thus, I only report results with robust standard errors. 
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roads on subway PMT. 56 The third lag of log subway and road capacity levels are also included 
to identify the growth effects.  
Column (1) reports results using a level regression with city fixed effects. The estimated 
elasticity of PMT to subway extent is significantly larger than one. Column (3) shows the results 
using the 3-year first-difference model and the elasticity is still larger than one. Ring interstate 
highways significantly reduce subway miles traveled. Column (4) results are obtained taking 
accounts of the time-varying city specific trends by including city fixed effects in the first-
difference model.  The estimated elasticity is 0.97, which is very close to unity.  
Columns (2), (5), and (6) display the results including the lagged subway and road 
capacity variables. The model specification in column (6) is preferred, as it removes all city 
invariant factors and controls for city specific trends. All three specifications show similar 
results, however. The unit elasticity result still holds. The coefficient for the ring highway miles 
variable is significantly negative, indicating ring highways reduce subway PMT. Subway 
extensions  made three years ago have a significant positive effect on current subway traffic. If a 
city added 10 percent more subways route miles three years ago, the current subway PMT has 
increased by 5.7 percent. There are two possible explanations for this lagged effect. First, people 
and economic activities may take time to respond to the changes of infrastructure. Second, 
subway expansions decentralize cities. Under a dispersed city structure, people have to commute 
longer distances. The expansions of interstate highways and ring highways in the past have 
positive effects on current subway PMT, although the coefficients are not significant. The 
negative coefficient on the lagged non-highway arterial road capacity variable indicates that 
                                                          
56 Baum-Snow et al. (2016) show that the decentralization effects on population and GDP vary across types of road in China. 
Compared with radial highways, ring highways are found to have larger effects.  
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expanding non-highway arterial road capacity reduces current subway usage. It seems that 
building more non-highway arterial roads only substitute traffic from subways. 
 
5.1.2     Instrumental variable results 
Instrumental variables are further used to identify the causal effects of subway route 
miles on PMT. The first stages of the 2SLS are presented in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2) are 
first stage regressions using transportation committee assignment seven years ago and the fifth-
year lag of log subway miles as instruments for the three-year changes of subway systems in 14 
cities. If a city had a representative on the transportation committee seven years ago, it is more 
likely to receive federal funding and experience subway extensions today. The five-year-lagged 
variable for subway miles also predicts well the current changes in subway miles. If the level of 
subway miles in the past was high, the current change of subway miles is smaller. Both 
instruments are strong with first-stage F statistics larger than ten.  
Table 5 displays the second stage results. Column (1) reports results for ln(PMT) when 
the transportation committee assignment variable is used as an instrument for the change of 
subway extent. The results support a unit elasticity. Adding more ring highways leads to fewer 
subway miles traveled and the coefficient of -0.13 is statistically significant. Column (2) results 
are based on using the subway length five years ago as an instrumental variable. All regression 
coefficients are similar to Colum (1). Column (3) uses both instruments, which enable me to do 
over-identification tests. The two instruments pass both Sargan and Basmann over-identification 
tests, confirming the validity of the instruments.57 Compared with the transportation committee 
assignment in Congress instrument, the lagged subway miles is a mechanical instrument, but it is 
                                                          
57 For space and conciseness, Table 5 only displays Sargan test results. The Basmann test result is similar. 
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valid and strong. Column (4) results further control the lagged capacity variables, and the 
evidence here is consistent the results reported in column (6) in Table 3. Overall, the empirical 
findings in Table 5 support the results in Table 3. 
In summary, the OLS, fixed effect, and 2SLS models support a unit elasticity of subway 
ridership with respect to subway extent. This unit elasticity confirms that the fundamental law of 
subway congestion holds. Extending the subway networks will not mitigate the congestion in 
subways, just as Duranton and Turner (2011) find that building more highways does not reduce 
highway congestion. Ring highways can replace subway traffic and the cross elasticity is around 
-0.13.  
 
5.2        The cross-elasticity of road VMT with respect to subway expansions 
This section reports results on whether adding more subway route miles in city affects 
VMT on highways and non-highway arterial roads. To compare with studies in literature, all 
analysis in this subsection is conducted at MSA level. 
 
5.2.1     The effect on VMT on interstate highways  
Table 6 shows the results of regressing interstate highway VMT on interstate highway 
and subway capacity variables. Column (1) reports results using level variables in an empirical 
model with fixed-effects. The estimated elasticity of VMT with respect to highway lane miles is 
larger than unity, confirming the fundamental law of highway congestion. The coefficient for 
subway route miles indicates that subway route miles have no significant effect on highway 
VMT. Columns (3) and (4) show results using first-difference models first without and then with 
MSA fixed effects. Column (4) controls for time varying city-specific unobserved factors. All 
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specifications confirm a unit elasticity of VMT to highway lane miles, which is consistent with 
Duranton and Turner (2011). No significant effect of subway route miles on VMT is found. 
Columns (2), (5), and (6) of Table 6 display results from a model including the lagged 
highway and subway variables. All three regressions show that the lagged subway route miles 
has a positive effect on current highway usage and this elasticity is about 0.09. Therefore, an 
expansion of 10 percent in subway directional route miles today will lead to an increase of 0.9 
percent in future highway VMT. These results indicate that the new subway lines take time to 
redistribute economic activity and decentralize cities. If the economic activities are less densely 
distributed, commuting distances become longer and VMT increase.  
The IV estimation results in Table 7 are consistent with the results reported in Table 6. 
The IV estimation uses subway route miles five years ago and seven years ago as instruments for 
the changes in subway route miles at time t and time t-3.58 The 1947 highway plan variable is 
adopted to instrument for current highway system. The first stages are presented in Table 4. 
Longer route miles in the past predict lower growth of subway length today. The first stages are 
strong with F statistics far larger than ten. The corresponding second stages are reported in Table 
7. The results reported in column (1) instrument the current highway network with a historical 
highway plan, and the coefficient measuring the effect of highway miles on VMT is 0.72. 
Duranton and Turner (2011) report that this elasticity is 1.03 after analyzing all the MSAs using 
data for 1983, 1993, and 2003. The difference between my estimate and their finding may result 
from two reasons. First, the sample is different as I focus on subway MSAs in the years of 1991-
                                                          
58 The transportation committee assignment of representatives is weak in power (first stage F statistics lower than ten. See Table 
A3) for instrumenting the changes of subways miles in MSAs, although it is strong for instrumenting the changes of subway 
miles in cities (Section 5.1.2). Thus, I only use the lagged subway miles as instruments in the first-difference model. The over-
identification tests in Section 5.1.2 support that the lagged subway miles are valid instruments. Nevertheless, the second stage 
results are similar when I use transportation committee assignment of representatives to instrument the changes of subway length 
in 10 MSAs. 
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2014. Second, the instrument might not be valid for only ten subway MSAs. When I estimate a 
similar 2SLS regression using all MSAs, I find the elasticity for VMT with respect to highway 
miles to be 0.98, which is close to Duranton and Turner’s (2011) elasticity estimate. The results 
in columns (2) and (3) instrument the current change of subway route miles and its lagged values 
using subway route miles five and seven years ago. Subways in the past improve current 
highway traffic and have no significant effect on contemporaneous highway traffic. The results 
reported in column (4) instrument ∆ln(S)𝑗𝑗 and ∆ln(S)𝑗𝑗−3 simultaneously, and the coefficient that 
measures the effect of subway route miles on VMT becomes insignificant.  
From these results, there is strong evidence that the VMT with respect to highway 
capacity elasticity is equal to one. Additional subway route miles do not lead to fewer VMT but 
increase VMT on interstate highways with a three-year lag. The empirical results also suggest 
that compared with highway extensions, people may take more time to respond to the change of 
subways, as the third lag of log subway length has a positive effect on PMT, while the third lag 
of highway length has no significant effect on VMT. These differences suggest that there might 
be much heterogeneity in the response times to the changes of different infrastructures. 
As mentioned in Section 2, the substitution effects of subways on highway usage would 
be small if these two modes are not close substitutes. Compared with interstate highways, ring 
highways are closer substitutes, as subways and ring highways share similar geographic 
coverages. Thus, subway expansions may have more prominent substitution effects on ring 
highway usage.  
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5.2.2     The effect on VMT on ring highways  
Table 8 and Table 9 display regression estimates for ring highway VMT using OLS, 
fixed effect, and 2SLS models, similar to the estimation strategy used for interstate highways. 
All specifications find the elasticity of VMT with respect to ring highway capacity is 
significantly larger than one, which is consistent with the result in Hsu and Zhang (2014). 
Different from the unit elasticity estimate for all MSAs in Duranton and Turner (2011), the 
elasticity in subway MSAs is larger, indicating a greater behavioral response to changes in ring 
highway systems in larger cities. The 1947 highway plan is not a strong instrument for current 
ring highway system. This makes intuitive sense, as the historical plan is for highways that 
connects different MSAs (radial highways), not for ring highways within a MSA. The results 
reported in column (1) in Table 9 should be interpreted with caution, as the results may suffer 
from weak IV problem. However, the long-lagged subway levels are strong instruments for the 
current changes of ring subways.  
All first-difference models indicate that contemporary subway expansions have a 
significantly negative effect on ring highway usage and this cross elasticity is around -0.08. 
Therefore, building more subways will reduce the congestion on ring highways. The lagged 
subway extent variables still predict more ring highway PMT today, although the magnitude is 
much smaller (the elasticity is about 0.04). The growth effect is smaller than the substitution 
effect. All these estimates are robust to the 2SLS results. 
The analysis in section 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 indicate that subway systems reduce 
contemporaneous traffic on ring highways but have no significant effect on contemporaneous 
traffic on interstate highways. As interstate highways include ring highways and radial highways, 
I expect subway expansions will not reduce traffic on radial highways. Radial highways have 
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higher travel speed and more extensive geographic coverage, so they are not close substitutes for 
subway systems.  
 
5.2.3    The effect on VMT on radial highways  
Table 10 displays the results of regressing radial highway VMT on subway route miles. 
Both the level and the first difference regressions show that subway systems do not reduce 
contemporaneous radial highway usage, but have a lagged and significantly positive effect on 
radial highway VMT. This growth effect (0.17) is much larger than the estimates for interstate 
highways (0.08) and ring highways (0.04). The empirical results support that subway systems do 
not reduce traffic on radial highways and will increase traffic on radial highways in future.      
Compared with ring highways, non-highway arterial roads are even better substitutes for 
subways as they have similar geographic coverages and travelling speed. Subways should have 
the largest substitution effects on usage of non-highway arterial roads. 
 
5.2.4    The effect on VMT on non-highway arterial roads  
Tables 11 and 12 exhibit the regression results for non-highway arterial roads. The 1947 
highway plan and long lagged subway extent are used as instruments for current non-highway 
arterials and current change of subways. Consistent with Duranton and Turner (2011), the own-
elasticity of arterial road usage with capacity is 0.87, which is significantly less than one. The 
fundamental law of arterial road congestion fails because building 1 percent more arterial roads 
leads to a less than 1 percent increase in traffic. The results in column (1) in Table 12 show a 
negative estimate of the elasticity, but the instrument (highway plan in year 1947) is not strong. 
The cross-elasticity of arterial road VMT with respect to subway route miles is 
significantly negative. The magnitude is around -0.14. Expanding subways by 10 percent will 
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reduce congestion on non-highway arterial roads by 1.4 percent. Therefore, both building more 
arterial roads and subways eliminate congestion on arterial roads. These findings are robust to all 
specifications, including the instrumental variable results (column 2-4 in Table 12). As expected, 
the relief effect of subways on non-highway arterial roads is much larger than that of ring 
highways and interstate highways. No growth effect exists, as subway expansions in the past 
have no significant effect on VMT of non-highway arterial roads. 
 
6.          Discussion 
6.1        The substitution and growth effects of subway expansions 
Duranton and Turner (2011) find that bus transit has no significant impact on interstate 
highway (including both radial highways and ring highways) usage and conclude that public 
transit will not alleviate highway congestion. The model in Section 2 and empirical evidence in 
this paper suggest the reason for their findings is that public transit is not a good substitute for 
interstate highways, especially for radial highways connecting different MSAs. Using the data 
for MSAs with subway systems, this paper confirms that subway expansions have no significant 
substitution effect on interstate highway VMT. However, I do find that adding more subway 
route miles significantly decreases the contemporaneous traffic on ring highways and non-
highway arterial roads. These findings echo those of Anderson (2014) that the delay on highways 
that are parallel to subway lines increases 47 percent when subway service ceases during a transit 
worker strike in Los Angeles. My findings here also explain the conclusions of Gendron-Carrier 
et al. (2017) that subway systems reduce air pollution. What I discover here reconciles the 
current literature. It is important to consider the heterogeneous effects of subway systems on 
different types of roads.  
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Non-highway arterial roads share at least two similar attributes with subways: small 
geographic coverages and low traveling speeds. Even though ring highways have high speed 
limits, they have similar geographic coverages to subways. However, radial highways share no 
similarities with subways due to large geographic coverages and faster speeds. My empirical 
evidence is consistent with the coverage and speed patterns, because subway expansions reduce 
VMT much more on non-highway arterial roads than on ring highways. As well, building more 
subways has no substitution effect on VMT on interstate and radial highways.  
Additional subway miles may also have long run effects on road miles in two ways: 
additional subway miles could cause population growth in the city and/or added miles could 
induce population decentralization and thus longer commutes.  Both could lead to more vehicle 
miles as well as more transit miles. If subways do not cause city to grow, as Gonzalez-Navarro 
and Tuerner (2016) suggest, the positive effects of subways on radial and ring highway VMT 
may come from the redistribution of economic activities within the MSA. In a more dispersed 
city structure, people could travel more miles on highways. The current studies (Nelson et al., 
2007; Parry and Small, 2009; Anderson, 2014) analyzing the effects of subways on road 
congestion generally neglect this growth effect. Although subways have both reducing and 
growth effects on ring highway traffic, the net effect of subway expansions should reduce traffic 
on ring highways, as the reducing effect dominates the growth effect.  
 
6.2        The substitution and growth effects of road extensions 
If adding more subway miles substitute traffic from roads, building more roads may also 
have a similar substitution effects. There is a symmetric substitution effect of ring-highway 
expansions on subway PMT. A 10 percent increase in ring highway lane miles decreases subway 
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PMT by 1.3 percent. However, this substitution effect is much smaller for non-highway arterial 
roads. Building 10 percent more non-highway arterial roads three years ago only reduces current 
subway PMT by 0.6 percent, and the contemporaneous changes of non-highway arterial roads 
have no significant impact on subway PMT. This is inconsistent with the expectation that non-
highway arterial roads are the closest substitutes for subways and should have the largest 
substitution effect. One possible explanation is the empirical finding that the fundamental law of 
road congestion does not apply to non-highway arterial roads. This indicates non-highway 
arterial roads are not congested,59 so people’s preference for non-highway arterial roads is not as 
strong as the preferences for subways and ring highways. Therefore, the extensions of arterial 
roads do not substitute many traffic from other travel modes. This may explain why non-
highway arterial roads have weak substitution effects on subway PMT. 
Expansions of radial or ring highways could decentralize cities and lead to longer trips. If 
there is a symmetric growth effect of highway expansions, subway PMT should increase after 
adding more highway miles. However, the empirical results find no significant effect of past 
highway expansions on current subway PMT. The reason for this contradiction might be that 
subway only accounts for less than 1 percent of total trips in US and the effect of highway 
expansions on subway PMT is too small to identify.60 
 
6.3        The existence of geographic coverage effect 
Table 1 displays four cases summarizing the possible consequences of subway 
extensions. The empirical findings support case four where the fundamental law of subway 
                                                          
59 The model in Hsu and Zhang (2014) shows that the failure of the fundamental law of non-highway arterial road congestion 
indicates that non-highway arterial roads are not congested. See Hsu and Zhang (2014) for detail. 
60 Highways decentralize cities and make length of trips longer, but the subway PMT may change little because of the tiny share 
of subways ridership in total trips. Table 2 shows that subway PMT is less than 1 percent of VMT on highways. 
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congestion holds and subways replace traffic on ring highways and non-highway arterial roads. 
Thus, traffic responds to the changes of geographic coverage (coverage effect exists and 
𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈/𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙 > 0) and the utilities of both driving and subway riding are improved. The same logic 
applies to ring highway expansions. The results in Table 5 and Table 9 show that ring highways 
shift people from subways and the fundamental law of ring highway congestion holds. 
Therefore, coverage effects also appear in ring highway extensions. The welfare implication is 
that constructing more subways and ring highways will reduce congestion and increase utilities 
of using these two modes.   
Building more subway lines will reduce traffic on ring highways, thus increase speed, but 
will not influence ring highways’ geographic coverage. If the fundamental law of ring highway 
congestion holds without coverage effect, subway extensions should have no effect on ring 
highway traffic. If subways shift some people away from ring highways, other travelers would 
take their place (Duranton and Turner, 2011). The empirical findings support the congestion 
relief effect of subways, however. Thus, the existence of fundamental law of ring highway 
congestion requires the geographic coverage effect. Both higher speeds and coverage effect lead 
to more ridership. The effect of faster speed alone is not large enough to make traffic increase the 
same percentage when highway lane miles grow by one percent. One corollary is that the law 
may not hold for highway extensions only adding more lanes and not changing the geographic 
coverage. Conducting empirical analysis for this prediction is beyond the scope of this paper due 
to data limitations.61  
 
                                                          
61 To test this corollary, the data should have a unique identification code for each road segment across time, so I can track the 
change of lanes for this road segment. The HPMS data has a unique identification code for each road segment in each year, but 
this code varies across time. The HPMS data is not a panel for each road segment. 
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6.4        The fundamental law of congestion also applies to bus and rail 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 confirm that the PMT increases one for one with subway route miles. 
This indicates the universality of the fundamental law of congestion. A subsequent question is 
whether the law holds for all transit modes, including bus and rail. Table A5 displays the results 
of regressing rail PMT on rail miles and regressing bus PMT on number of buses. Both the fixed 
effect model and IV model show that the estimated elasticities are one or greater, demonstrating 
that the law holds for other transit modes. Table A6 also shows that bus transit is complementary 
to rail transit, while the expansions of both subway and rail networks substitute traffic from bus 
transit.  
 
7.          Conclusions 
This paper estimates the elasticity of subway PMT and highway VMT to subway route 
miles by analyzing US subway cities and MSAs between the years 1991 and 2014. A theoretical 
model is proposed to analyze the effect of subway (highway) expansions on congestion. OLS, 
fixed effect model, and 2SLS are used in level and first-difference regressions to calculate the 
estimates.  
The elasticity of subway PMT with respect to subway route miles is 1.27, which 
demonstrates that the fundamental law of road congestion also applies to subways. Robustness 
checks show that the law also holds for rail and bus. Subway expansions have both substitution 
and growth effects on road traffic. Subways are found to reduce traffic on roads that are close 
substitutes (ring highways and non-highway arterial roads). A 10 percent expansion of subway 
length reduces contemporaneous traffic on ring highways and non-highway arterial roads by 0.7 
percent and 1.4 percent. Past subway extensions increase highway traffic today. A 10 percent 
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increase in subway capacity three years ago leads to a 0.4 percent increase in VMT on ring 
highways and to a 1.7% percent increase in VMT on radial highways. The lagged effects of 
subway expansions on VMT appear to result from the effect of subway expansions on 
decentralization of economic activities in cities and longer commutes.  Taking both the short run 
effects and long run effects into consideration, subways reduce traffic on ring highways and non-
arterial roads, but increases congestion on radial highways.   
Combined with the theoretical results, the empirical evidence predicts the existence of 
coverage effect and welfare improving effect of subway expansions. The coverage effect is 
necessary for the fundamental law of highway/subway congestion. 
The findings of this paper provide evidence that can be used in cost-benefit analysis of 
subway projects. The estimated elasticity of subway usage to subway extent helps to predict the 
trend of ridership. The estimated elasticities of VMT with respect to subway route length 
indicate the potential gains in congestion relief, which is one of the benefits of providing more 
subways. The policy makers have to consider the different effects of subway extensions on 
congestion levels on different types of roads. The benefit in congestion relief is the largest for 
non-highway arterial roads. Subways are not useful for reducing congestion on radial highways. 
The benefits identified in this paper are lower bounds, however, as the effects on local roads’ 
congestion are not studied. 
Subways may have an even larger substitution impact on local road traffic. The HPMS 
data has lots of missing values for the VMT of local roads, so it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to identify the impacts of subway expansions on VMT of local roads. The other public transit 
modes, including rail and bus, also deserve further analysis. These plausible extensions are left 
for future research.  
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Figure 1: The effect of capacity expansions on speed or comfort 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The effect of subway expansions (no geographic coverage effect) 
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Figure 3: The effect of subway expansions (geographic coverage effect) 
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Table 1: Summarization of the effects of subway expansions 
Cases 
Existence of 
geographic coverage 
effect and 𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈/𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙 > 0 Utility is increased ( 𝑈𝑈′ > 𝑈𝑈0) The fundamental law of subway (road) congestion holds 
Subway (road) 
expansions reduce 
highway (subway) 
usage 
1            No No  Yes No 2 Yes No Yes 
3           Yes No Yes  No 4 Yes Yes or No Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for subway and road capacities and performance (1991-2014) 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
Cross 
section 
 
Temporal 
variation 
     
PMT (in Ms) 949 2080 2100 459 
Subway route miles  104 123 127 10.0 
Transportation committee 
 
0.39 0.56 0.38 0.42 
     
VMT (IH, in Ms) 114980 78470 79930 19820 
Lane miles (IH) 2428 1197 1212 324 
VMT (RH, in Ms) 49270 43800 44900 10040 
Lane miles (RH) 1008 600 608 158 
VMT (non-highway arterial, in 
 
69350 48540 43430 25370 
Lane miles (non-highway arterial) 9939 6715 5982 3571 
1Ms denotes millions. PMT is annual passenger miles traveled. VMT is annual vehicle miles traveled. IH refers to interstate 
highways. RH denotes ring highways. The summary statistics are for subway cities/MSAs. 
2 Transportation committee assignment is equal to 1 if the city has a representative on board. 0 otherwise.  
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Table 3: ln(Passenger miles traveled) of Subways (OLS, 1991-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Level  3-year difference 
VARIABLES City FE City FE OLS City FE OLS City FE 
ln(Subway miles)t 1.65*** 0.80***     
 (0.074) (0.18)     
ln(IH lane miles)t 0.19 0.34***     
 (0.12) (0.092)     
ln(RH lane miles)t -0.18* -0.25***     
 (0.097) (0.075)     
ln(NHAR lane miles)t -0.040 -0.053     
 (0.044) (0.037)     
ln(Subway miles)t-3  0.66***     
  (0.13)     
ln(IH lane miles)t-3  -0.28     
  (0.18)     
ln(RH lane miles)t-3  0.31     
  (0.22)     
ln(NHAR lane miles)t-3  -0.00067     
  (0.045)     
       
∆ln(Subway miles)t   1.19**
* 
0.97*** 0.99*** 0.97*** 
   (0.18) (0.17) (0.13) (0.14) 
∆ln(IH lane miles)t   0.049 -0.016 0.12 0.096 
   (0.090) (0.10) (0.080) (0.088) 
∆ln(RH lane miles)t   -0.12** -0.089 -0.15*** -0.14** 
   (0.056) (0.062) (0.054) (0.058) 
∆ln(NHAR lane miles)t   0.016 0.034 0.033 0.056 
   (0.023) (0.041) (0.032) (0.036) 
∆ln(Subway miles)t-3     0.61*** 0.57*** 
     (0.17) (0.19) 
∆ln(IH lane miles)t-3     0.013 0.10 
     (0.24) (0.26) 
∆ln(RH lane miles)t-3     0.16 0.10 
     (0.28) (0.29) 
∆ln(NHAR lane miles)t-3     -0.040 -
0.057** 
     (0.026) (0.025) 
       
City FE 14 14 - 14 - 14 
Observations 328 286 286 286 244 244 
R-squared 0.991 0.993 0.509 0.564 0.583 0.610 
1 IH denotes interstate highways. RH refers to ring highways. NHAR annotates non-highway arterial roads. Year fixed effects 
are included in all regressions. City population is controlled but not listed.  
2Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: First stage regression results of instrumenting for changes of subway miles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 14 Cities 10 MSAs 
VARIABLES ∆ln(S)t ∆ln(S)t ln(IH)t ∆ln(S)t ∆ln(S)t-3 
      
Representative on transportation  0.10***     
committee of Congress 7 years 
ago (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
(0.029)     
      
Subway route miles 5 years ago  -0.58***  -0.54***  
  (0.089)  (0.086)  
Highway plan in 1947   0.55***   
   (0.081)   
Subway route miles 7 years ago     -0.48*** 
     (0.084) 
      
City/MSA FE 14 14 - 10 10 
F statistics for instruments 12.42 39.68 46.35 39.76 34.14 
      
Observations 261 258 237 232 228 
R-squared 0.445 0.797 0.903 0.760 0.734 
1The change is a three-year difference, i.e., ∆ln(S)t =ln(S)t - ln(S)t-3. 
2Controlled but not listed variables: year fixed effects, change of population and its lag, change of highway lane miles and its 
lag. 
3Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at MSAs for using highway plan 1947 as an IV. *** 
p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 93 
 
Table 5: ln(Passenger miles traveled) of Subways (2SLS, 1991-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES IV1 for 
∆ln(S)t 
IV2 for 
∆ln(S)t 
Both IVs for 
∆ln(S)t 
Both IVs for 
∆ln(S)t 
     
∆ln(Subway miles)t 1.06*** 1.27*** 1.27*** 1.04*** 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.17) 
∆ln(IH lane miles)t -0.0099 0.018 0.018 0.098 
 (0.096) (0.094) (0.094) (0.081) 
∆ln(RH lane miles)t -0.13** -0.11* -0.11* -0.13** 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.052) 
∆ln(NHAR lane miles)t 0.092 0.030 0.030 0.047 
 (0.065) (0.050) (0.050) (0.034) 
∆ln(Population)t 0.92*** 0.90** 0.90** 0.53 
 (0.33) (0.36) (0.36) (0.35) 
     
∆ln(Subway miles)t-3    0.56*** 
    (0.17) 
∆ln(IH lane miles)t-3    0.11 
    (0.24) 
∆ln(RH lane miles)t-3    0.091 
    (0.27) 
∆ln(NHAR lane miles)t-3    -0.059** 
    (0.023) 
     
City FE 14 14 14 14 
F statistics of first stage 12.42 39.68 39.62 85.35 
p-value of over-identification 
test 
- - 0.32 0.72 
     
Observations 261 258 258 244 
R-squared 0.572 0.503 0.503 0.609 
1IH denotes interstate highways. RH refers to ring highways. NHAR annotates non-highway arterial roads. Year fixed effects 
are included in all regressions. 
2IV1 is whether the city has a representative on transportation committee of Congress 7 years ago. IV2 is subway miles 5 
years ago. The change is a three-year difference, i.e., ∆ln(S)t =ln(S)t - ln(S)t-3. 
3Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6: ln(Vehicle miles traveled) on Interstate Highways (OLS, 1991-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Level  3-year difference 
VARIABLES MSA FE MSA FE OLS MSA FE OLS MSA FE 
       
ln(IH lane miles)t 1.13*** 1.10***     
 (0.033) (0.046)     
ln(Subway miles)t 0.00046 -0.036     
 (0.012) (0.028)     
ln(Population)t 0.19** 0.14*     
 (0.082) (0.080)     
ln(IH lane miles)t-3  0.23**     
  (0.098)     
ln(Subway miles)t-3  0.050***     
  (0.019)     
       
∆ln(IH lane miles)t   1.10*** 1.08*** 1.11*** 1.09*** 
   (0.052) (0.060) (0.049) (0.057) 
∆ln(Subway miles)t   -0.023 -0.018 -0.044* -0.031 
   (0.016) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026) 
∆ln(Population)t   0.24 0.20 0.23 0.19 
   (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) 
∆ln(IH lane miles)t-3     0.030 0.0057 
     (0.073) (0.063) 
∆ln(Subway miles)t-3     0.066*** 0.090*** 
     (0.017) (0.024) 
       
MSA FE 10 10 - 10 - 10 
       
Observations 237 234 234 234 231 231 
R-squared 0.996 0.996 0.879 0.883 0.882 0.887 
1IH refers to interstate highways. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
2Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7: ln(Vehicle miles traveled) on Interstate Highways (2SLS, 1991-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Level 3-year difference 
VARIABLES IV for ln(IH)t 
IV for 
∆ln(S)t IV for ∆ln(S)t-3 
IVs for 
 ∆ln(S)t and 
∆ln(S)t-3 
     
ln(IH lane miles)t 0.74***    
 (0.22)    
ln(Subway miles)t -0.097    
 (0.064)    
ln(Population)t 0.36    
 (0.24)    
     
∆ln(IH lane miles)t  1.08*** 1.09*** 1.09*** 
  (0.056) (0.052) (0.054) 
∆ln(Subway miles)t  0.042 -0.040 0.019 
  (0.032) (0.037) (0.081) 
∆ln(Population)t  0.20 0.19 0.19 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
∆ln(IH lane miles)t-3   0.0061 0.0061 
   (0.058) (0.058) 
∆ln(Subway miles)t-3   0.089** 0.062 
   (0.037) (0.062) 
     
MSA FE - 10 10 10 
F statistics of first stage 27.48 39.76 61.97 - 
     
Observations 237 232 230 230 
R-squared 0.848 0.882 0.887 0.886 
1IH refers to interstate highway. IV for current highway lane miles is highway plan in year 1947. IVs for ∆ln(S)t and ∆ln(S)t-3 
are subway miles in year t-5 and year t-7. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
2Robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustered standard errors at MSAs for (1). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 8: ln(Vehicle miles traveled) on Ring Highways (OLS, 1991-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Level  3-year difference 
VARIABLES MSA 
FE 
MSA FE OLS MSA FE OLS MSA FE 
       
ln(RH lane miles)t 1.20*** 1.19***     
 (0.070) (0.074)     
ln(Subway miles)t -0.025* -0.050     
 (0.014) (0.032)     
ln(Population)t 0.030 0.013     
 (0.096) (0.100)     
ln(RH lane miles)t-3  0.25***     
  (0.054)     
ln(Subway miles)t-3  0.065***     
  (0.019)     
       
∆ln(RH lane miles)t   1.21*** 1.21*** 1.19*** 1.19*** 
   (0.071) (0.066) (0.080) (0.077) 
∆ln(Subway miles)t   -0.091*** -0.088*** -0.061*** -0.067** 
   (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) 
∆ln(Population)t   1.22*** 1.24*** 0.19 0.86** 
   (0.13) (0.14) (0.19) (0.36) 
∆ln(RH lane miles)t-3     0.011 0.0092 
     (0.060) (0.057) 
∆ln(Subway miles)t-3     0.047*** 0.039* 
     (0.018) (0.020) 
       
MSA FE 10 10 - 10 - 10 
       
Observations 237 234 234 234 228 228 
R-squared 0.997 0.998 0.934 0.945 0.943 0.947 
1RH refers to ring highways. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
2Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7: ln(vehicle miles traveled) on Ring Highways (2SLS, 1991-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Level 3-year difference 
VARIABLES IV for ln(RH)t IV for ∆ln(S)t IV for ∆ln(S)t-3 
IVs for 
 ∆ln(S)t and 
∆ln(S)t-3 
     
ln(RH lane miles)t 1.12***    
 (0.28)    
ln(Subway miles)t -0.10    
 (0.080)    
ln(Population)t 0.091    
 (0.27)    
     
∆ln(RH lane miles)t  1.21*** 1.19*** 1.19*** 
  (0.061) (0.071) (0.070) 
∆ln(Subway miles)t  -0.072*** -0.056** -0.084** 
  (0.023) (0.028) (0.038) 
∆ln(Population)t  1.24*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 
  (0.13) (0.32) (0.33) 
∆ln(RH lane miles)t-3   0.0090 0.0092 
   (0.052) (0.052) 
∆ln(Subway miles)t-3   0.037 0.049* 
   (0.027) (0.029) 
     
MSA FE - 10 10 10 
F statistics of first stage 2.47 40.00 64.64 - 
     
Observations 237 232 227 227 
R-squared 0.879 0.945 0.947 0.947 
1 RH refers to ring highways. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
2IV for ln(RH)t is highway plan in year 1947. IVs for ∆ln(S)t and ∆ln(S)t-3 are subway miles in year t-5 and year t-7.  
3Robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustered standard errors at MSAs for (1). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 10: ln(Vehicle miles traveled) on Radial Highways  (1991-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Level 3-year difference 
VARIABLES MSA FE 
MSA 
FE 
MSA 
FE 
IV for 
∆ln(S)t 
MSA 
FE 
IV for ∆ln(S)t 
& ∆ln(S)t-3 
       
ln(RAH lane miles)t 1.32*** 1.30***     
 (0.21) (0.22)     
ln(Subway miles)t 0.033 -0.051     
 (0.021) (0.051)     
ln(Population)t -0.11 -0.25     
 (0.29) (0.29)     
ln(RAH lane miles)t-3  0.21     
  (0.13)     
ln(Subway miles)t-3  0.075**     
  (0.031)     
       
∆ln(RAH lane miles)t   1.29*** 1.29*** 1.30*** 1.30*** 
   (0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.21) 
∆ln(Subway miles)t   0.019 0.15** -0.020 0.00032 
   (0.035) (0.064) (0.041) (0.10) 
∆ln(Population)t   0.10 0.10 0.100 0.096 
   (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) 
∆ln(RAH lane miles)t-3     0.030 0.028 
     (0.061) (0.055) 
∆ln(Subway miles)t-3     0.15*** 0.20** 
     (0.051) (0.090) 
       
MSA FE 10 10 10 10 10 10 
F statistics of first stage - - - 39.51 - - 
       
Observations 237 234 234 232 231 230 
R-squared 0.978 0.979 0.849 0.846 0.853 0.852 
1RAH refers to radial highways, which are 1- or 2-digit highways that connect different MSAs. Year fixed effects are included 
in all regressions. 
2Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 11: ln(Vehicle miles traveled) on Non-Highway Arterial Roads  (OLS, 1991-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Level  3-year difference 
VARIABLES MSA FE MSA FE OLS MSA FE OLS MSA FE 
       
ln(NHAR lane miles)t 0.89*** 0.89***     
 (0.025) (0.029)     
ln(Subway miles)t -0.12*** -0.20***     
 (0.022) (0.045)     
ln(Population)t 0.32*** 0.34***     
 (0.12) (0.13)     
ln(NHAR lane miles)t-3  0.0026     
  (0.021)     
ln(Subway miles)t-3  0.039     
  (0.024)     
       
∆ln(NHAR lane miles)t   0.87*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 
   (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) 
∆ln(Subway miles)t   -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 
   (0.026) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) 
∆ln(Population)t   0.066 0.051 0.064 0.047 
   (0.070) (0.077) (0.070) (0.079) 
∆ln(NHAR lane miles)t-3     -0.0046 -0.0094 
     (0.011) (0.011) 
∆ln(Subway miles)t-3     0.026 0.024 
     (0.018) (0.025) 
       
MSA FE 10 10 - 10 - 10 
       
Observations 237 234 234 234 231 231 
R-squared 0.987 0.987 0.960 0.964 0.960 0.964 
1NHAR refers to non-highway arterial roads. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
2Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 12: ln(Vehicle miles traveled) on Non-Highway Arterial Roads  (2SLS, 1991-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Level 3-year difference 
VARIABLES IV for ln(NHAR)t 
IV for 
∆ln(S)t 
IV for 
∆ln(S)t-3 
IV for 
 ∆ln(S)t and 
∆ln(S)t-3 
     
ln(NHAR lane miles)t -0.31    
 (0.47)    
ln(Subway miles)t -0.074    
 (0.057)    
ln(Population)t 1.24**    
 (0.52)    
     
∆ln(NHAR lane miles)t  0.87*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
∆ln(Subway miles)t  -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.13** 
  (0.035) (0.041) (0.061) 
∆ln(Population)t  0.052 0.046 0.046 
  (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) 
∆ln(NHAR lane miles)t-3   -0.0100 -0.0099 
   (0.011) (0.010) 
∆ln(Subway miles)t-3   0.033 0.032 
   (0.036) (0.045) 
     
MSA FE - 10 10 10 
F statistics of first stage  7.35 38.37 57.09 - 
     
Observations 237 232 230 230 
R-squared 0.606 0.964 0.964 0.964 
1NHAR refers to non-highway arterial roads. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
2IV for current highway lane miles is highway plan in year 1947. IVs for ∆ln(S)t and ∆ln(S)t-3 are subway miles in year t-5 and 
year t-7. 
3Robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustered standard errors at MSAs for (1). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Robustness check for using 1-year difference (1991-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Subway PMT Interstate Highway VMT Ring highway VMT 
Non-highway 
arterial road VMT 
 FE FE IV for  
∆ln(S)t FE FE FE FE FE FE 
∆ln(Subway miles)t 0.64** 0.53* 1.20*** -0.019 -0.014 -0.049* -0.030 -0.13*** -0.15*** 
 (0.32) (0.30) (0.45) (0.029) (0.036) (0.030) (0.034) (0.042) (0.049) 
∆ln(IH lane miles)t 0.0079 0.028 0.027 1.16*** 1.17***     
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.067) (0.041) (0.040)     
∆ln(RH lane miles)t -0.00092 -0.0098 -0.0050   1.21*** 1.21***   
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.032)   (0.062) (0.063)   
∆ln(NHAR lane miles)t -0.0067 -0.00078 -0.0070     0.86*** 0.86*** 
 (0.022) (0.014) (0.024)     (0.023) (0.023) 
∆ln(Population)t 0.18 -0.12 0.25 0.74 0.61 1.70* 0.99 -0.63 -0.41 
 (0.46) (0.46) (0.40) (0.56) (0.58) (0.86) (0.62) (0.78) (0.77) 
∆ln(Subway miles)t-3  0.41*   0.064**  0.041  0.029 
  (0.22)   (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.034) 
∆ln(IH lane miles)t-3  0.18   0.033     
  (0.24)   (0.076)     
∆ln(RH lane miles)t-3  0.11     0.093   
  (0.27)     (0.072)   
∆ln(NHAR lane miles)t-3  -0.020       -0.0045 
  (0.026)       (0.012) 
          
MSA/City FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
F statistics of first stage - - 9.36 - - - - - - 
Observations 314 272 276 236 233 236 232 236 233 
R-squared 0.315 0.305 0.276 0.940 0.941 0.952 0.970 0.975 0.976 
1IV for ∆ln(S)t is whether the city has a representative on transportation committee of Congress 7 years ago. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
2 IH denotes interstate highways. RH refers to ring highways. NHAR annotates non-highway arterial roads. 
3 Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A2: Robustness check for using 5-year difference (1991-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Subway PMT Interstate Highway VMT Ring highway VMT 
Non-highway 
arterial road VMT 
 FE FE IV for  
∆ln(S)t FE FE FE FE FE FE 
∆ln(Subway miles)t 1.20*** 0.93*** 1.19*** -0.0069 -0.024 -
0.094*** 
-0.059 -0.12*** -0.19*** 
 (0.088) (0.15) (0.21) (0.019) (0.041) (0.018) (0.042) (0.024) (0.043) 
∆ln(IH lane miles)t 0.083 0.14 0.081 1.00*** 1.00***     
 (0.12) (0.096) (0.11) (0.089) (0.092)     
∆ln(RH lane miles)t -0.12 -0.14** -0.12*   1.21*** 1.18***   
 (0.075) (0.062) (0.070)   (0.051) (0.060)   
∆ln(NHAR lane miles)t -0.012 0.053 -0.010     0.85*** 0.85*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.046)     (0.019) (0.019) 
∆ln(Population)t 0.71 0.099 0.71* 0.27*** 0.28*** 1.32*** 0.89** 0.067 0.036 
 (0.44) (0.55) (0.41) (0.063) (0.080) (0.24) (0.36) (0.044) (0.044) 
          
∆ln(Subway miles)t-3  0.51***   0.059**  0.0063  0.086** 
  (0.098)   (0.027)  (0.033)  (0.035) 
∆ln(IH lane miles)t-3  -0.048   -0.035     
  (0.28)   (0.065)     
∆ln(RH lane miles)t-3  0.16     0.0086   
  (0.34)     (0.059)   
∆ln(NHAR lane miles)t-3  -0.011       -0.016 
  (0.037)       (0.011) 
          
MSA/City FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
F statistics of first stage - - 18.74 - - - - - - 
Observations 258 216 258 232 228 230 224 232 228 
R-squared 0.738 0.698 0.738 0.907 0.909 0.934 0.939 0.968 0.969 
1IV for ∆ln(S)t is whether the city has a representative on transportation committee of Congress 7 years ago. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
2 IH denotes interstate highways. RH refers to ring highways. NHAR annotates non-highway arterial roads. 
3 Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A3: ∆ln(Passenger miles travelled) of Subways (MSA level, 1991-2014) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FE FE IV1 IV2 Both IVs Both IVs 
       
∆ln(Subway miles)t 0.92*** 0.90*** 1.05*** 1.15*** 1.15*** 0.96*** 
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.32) (0.23) (0.23) (0.16) 
∆ln(IH lane miles)t -0.016 0.058 -0.14 -0.12 -0.12 0.021 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.090) (0.090) (0.080) 
∆ln(RH lane miles)t -0.074 -0.078 -0.0057 0.019 0.019 -0.072 
 (0.061) (0.076) (0.064) (0.061) (0.060) (0.052) 
∆ln(NHAR lane miles)t 0.023 -0.0016 0.083 0.034 0.034 0.059* 
 (0.047) (0.037) (0.082) (0.054) (0.054) (0.036) 
∆ln(MSA population)t 0.35*** 1.64** 2.91*** 3.20*** 3.20*** 1.83*** 
 (0.084) (0.79) (0.88) (0.72) (0.72) (0.68) 
       
∆ln(Subway miles)t-3  0.52***    0.49*** 
  (0.19)    (0.18) 
∆ln(IH lane miles)t-3  -0.012    0.37** 
  (0.13)    (0.18) 
∆ln(RH lane miles)t-3  -0.046    -0.12 
  (0.095)    (0.20) 
∆ln(NHAR lane miles)t-3  -0.030    -0.043** 
  (0.025)    (0.020) 
       
MSA FE 10 10 10 10 10 10 
F statistics of first stage - - 3.36 46.50 30.41 69.18 
Over-identification test - - - - 0.88 0.54 
       
Observations 234 228 189 187 187 186 
R-squared 0.629 0.653 0.683 0.635 0.635 0.719 
1IV1 is transportation committee assignment 7 years ago. IV2 is subway miles 5 years ago. Year fixed effects are included in 
all regressions. 
2 IH denotes interstate highways. RH refers to ring highways. NHAR annotates non-highway arterial roads. 
3Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A4: Robustness check of using 4-year lag (1991-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Subway PMT 
Interstate 
Highway 
VMT 
Ring Highway 
VMT 
Non-highway 
Arterial road 
VMT 
     
∆ln(Subway miles)t 1.32*** -0.018 -0.042 -0.12*** 
 (0.26) (0.036) (0.027) (0.045) 
∆ln(IH lane miles)t 0.018 1.09***   
 (0.094) (0.059)   
∆ln(RH lane miles)t -0.12*  1.19***  
 (0.059)  (0.077)  
∆ln(NHAR lane miles)t 0.087**   0.87*** 
 (0.035)   (0.026) 
∆ln(Population)t 0.69 0.18 0.82** 0.047 
 (0.43) (0.21) (0.36) (0.079) 
     
∆ln(Subway miles)t-4 0.26* 0.051 0.035* 0.015 
 (0.15) (0.036) (0.019) (0.025) 
∆ln(IH lane miles)t-4 -0.091 -0.0032   
 (0.26) (0.051)   
∆ln(RH lane miles)t-4 0.19  -0.033  
 (0.33)  (0.035)  
∆ln(NHAR lane miles)t-4 -0.056   -0.0071 
 (0.038)   (0.0093) 
     
MSA/City FE Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 230 230 226 230 
R-squared 0.535 0.885 0.951 0.964 
1 IH denotes interstate highways. RH refers to ring highways. NHAR annotates non-highway arterial roads. Year fixed effects 
are included in all regressions. 
2 Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A5: ∆ln(Passenger miles traveled) of Rail and Bus  (1991-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ∆ln(PMT) for rail ∆ln(PMT) for bus 
VARIABLES FE IV for ∆ln(R)t FE  IV for ∆ln(B)t 
     
∆ln(Rail miles)t 1.02*** 1.40*** -0.067*** -0.098*** 
 (0.19) (0.16) (0.023) (0.032) 
∆ln(Number of bus)t 0.26* 0.31** 0.88*** 1.08*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.093) (0.11) 
∆ln(Subway miles)t 0.032 0.031 -0.092** -0.081* 
 (0.077) (0.065) (0.042) (0.043) 
∆ln(Population)t 4.05*** 3.98*** 0.17 0.039 
 (0.98) (0.98) (0.18) (0.17) 
     
City FE 38 38 394 394 
F statistics for first stage - 13.02 - 52.97 
     
Observations 470 470 5,275 4,561 
R-squared 0.615 0.579 0.303 0.281 
1 ∆ln(R)t refers to ∆ln(Rail miles)t. Rail includes light rail and commuter rail. ∆ln(B)t denotes ∆ln(Number of bus)t. Year fixed 
effects are included in all regressions. All differences are 3-year difference. 
2 IV for ∆ln(R)t is rail miles 3 years ago. IV for ∆ln(B)t is number of buses 5 years ago. 
3 Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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